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POLITICS, IDENTITY, AND CLASS
CERTIFICATION ON THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang*
This Article draws on novel data and presents the results of the first empirical
analysis of how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals judges
influence class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. We find that the ideological composition of the panel (measured by the
party of the appointing president) has a very strong association with certifica-
tion outcomes, with all-Democratic panels having dramatically higher rates of
procertification outcomes than all-Republican panels—nearly triple in about
the past twenty years. We also find that the presence of one African American
on a panel, and the presence of two women (but not one), is associated with
procertification outcomes.
Our results show that, contrary to conventional wisdom in scholarship on di-
versity on the Courts of Appeals, the impact of diversity extends beyond con-
ceptions of “women’s issues” or “minority issues.” The consequences of gender
and racial diversity on the bench, through application and elaboration of cer-
tification law, radiate widely across the legal landscape, influencing imple-
mentation in such areas as consumer, securities, labor and employment,
antitrust, insurance, product liability, environmental, and many other areas
of law. In considering possible explanations for our findings on the procertifi-
cation preferences of women and African Americans, we note that class action
doctrine, as transsubstantive procedural law, traverses many policy areas. As
strategic actors, it would be rational for judges to take into consideration how
class-certification doctrine in a case that does not implicate issues on which
they have distinctive preferences might affect certification in cases that do. Al-
ternatively, or in addition, our results may be the first evidence that transsub-
stantive procedural law affecting access to justice is itself a policy domain in
which women and African Americans have distinctive preferences. In either
case, the results highlight the importance of exploring the effects of diversity on
transsubstantive procedural law more generally.
* Stephen B. Burbank is David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice at the
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. Sean Farhang is Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt Profes-
sor of Law, and Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, at the University of California,
Berkeley. Christopher Karpowitz, John Kastellec, Bert Kritzer, Serena Mayeri, Ted McKee, and
Tali Mendelberg provided helpful comments on a draft. Christina Crowley, Berkeley Law Class
of 2020, and Tracy Nelson, Yale Law Class of 2019, provided excellent research assistance.
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Our findings on gender panel effects in particular are novel in the literature on
panel effects and the literature on gender and judging. Past work focusing on
substantive antidiscrimination law found that one woman can influence the
votes of men in the majority (mirroring what we find with respect to African
Americans in class-certification decisions). These results allowed for optimism
that the panel structure—which threatens to dilute the influence of un-
derrepresented groups on the bench because they are infrequently in the panel
majority—actually facilitates minority influence, whether through delibera-
tion, cue taking, bargaining, or some other mechanism.
Our gender results are quite different and normatively troubling. We observe
that women have substantially more procertification preferences based on out-
comes when they are in the majority. However, panels with one woman are
not more likely to yield procertification outcomes. Panels with women in the
majority occur at sharply lower rates than women’s percentage of judgeships,
and thus certification doctrine underrepresents their preferences relative to
their share of judgeships and overrepresents those of male judges.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the relationship between the ideology, gender, and
race of U.S. Court of Appeals judges and decisions addressing class certifica-
tion under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Political conflict
over federal judicial nominees has become a familiar feature of the American
political landscape. Presidents have increasingly come to regard federal judges
with aligned preferences as a critical component of the infrastructure for
elaborating and implementing their national political and policy agendas.
Correspondingly, presidential administrations have paid increasing attention
to scrutinizing potential nominees in the hopes of identifying those with pref-
erences most likely to advance administration goals. Political opponents of
presidential administrations are, of course, attentive to the same concerns,
and it seems that the harder presidents work to nominate ideologically
aligned candidates, the harder opponents work to defeat them, often charac-
terizing them as ideological extremists. The focus of this battle extends be-
yond conventional markers of ideology and encompasses issues of gender and
racial diversity, with some critics attacking presidential administrations for
staffing the federal courts with judges that fail to reflect the country’s diversi-
ty.
The concern for gender and racial diversity on the federal bench is often
tied to issues of representation. Pitkin’s classic distinction between descriptive
and substantive representation is useful for clarifying two conceptions of rep-
resentation that are relevant to racial and gender diversity on the bench.1 An
institution of governance is descriptively representative to the extent that it
mirrors, in salient respects, the composition of the community that it governs.
Substantive representation, in contrast, is concerned with whether govern-
mental actors, in their decision making, actually represent the distinctive
preferences or interests of a community that they are associated with.2
Advocates of increasing, and scholars studying, the representation of
women and members of racial minorities on the bench have long been con-
cerned with both forms of representation. One goal of increasing diversity on
the bench is to create a bench that descriptively reflects the country’s diversi-
ty, which itself can promote the judiciary’s appearance of impartiality and en-
hance its democratic legitimacy.3 Another purpose concerns legal substance.
Some believe that women and members of racial minorities have different
preferences that are potentially consequential to case outcomes, and in par-
ticular that they are more sensitive than white men to issues of discrimination
1. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
2. Id. at 80, 184.
3. See SUSAN B. HAIRE & LAURA P. MOYER, DIVERSITY MATTERS: JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2015); Allison P. Harris & Maya Sen, Bias and Judg-
ing, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 241, 247 (2019); Susan Moloney Smith, Comment, Diversifying the
Judiciary: The Influence of Gender and Race on Judging, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 179, 198 (1994); Carl
Tobias, Commentary, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 177
(1990).
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and inequality in their substantive decision making.4 The primary reason giv-
en for this view is that women and members of racial minorities are more
likely to have seen or been subjected to discrimination, and these distinctive
life experiences make the judges more likely to believe a plaintiff’s evidence of
discrimination and to empathize with such plaintiffs.5
Debates over gender and racial diversity in federal judicial appointments
have escalated in recent years. In the first two years of his administration,
Trump’s judicial appointments were 92% white and 76% male.6 One recent
study described where this places Trump’s appointments in historical context:
Trump has appointed white men in numbers not seen in nearly three
decades, reversing a four-decade trend across both Democratic and Republi-
can administrations of increasing the diversity of judges appointed to the
federal bench over time. Among Democratic presidents, the share of white
males appointed to the bench shrank from 66 percent during Carter’s Ad-
ministration, to 53 percent during Clinton’s administration, and they repre-
sented a mere 36 percent of Obama’s appointees to the bench. Republican
presidents have appointed more white males and fewer diverse judges to the
bench compared to Democratic presidents. Until now, however, they too ev-
idenced a trend towards greater judicial diversity with the share of white
male judges appointed by Reagan at 86 percent, but falling to 73 percent un-
der Bush I and falling yet again under Bush II to 67 percent. Trump has re-
versed this decade-long trend by appointing approximately 70 percent white
male judges to the federal bench.7
Underpinning battles over the ideological, gender, and racial complexion
of the federal courts as it bears on substantive representation is an empirical
assumption: the ideology and identity of federal judges matter to how they
decide some cases. It is no wonder, then, that the relationship between judge
characteristics and judicial decision making is among the largest fields of in-
quiry in the social scientific study of courts. Scholars have done substantial
empirical work on the role of ideology, gender, and race in judicial decision
4. See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 3, at 6, 13–114; Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diver-
sity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113 (1999); Christina L. Boyd, Lee
Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI.
389 (2010); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Con-
fidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000).
5. See, e.g., HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 3, at 32, 48; Boyd et al., supra note 4; Ifill, supra
note 4; Joy Milligan, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions
About Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206 (2006).
6. Stacy Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial Legacy, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 20,
30 (2019). As of August 1, 2020, fifty-three of Trump’s nominees to the Courts of Appeals had
been confirmed, of whom 85% were white and 79% were men. There are no African Americans
in this group. One of them is Hispanic, and seven are Asian-Americans. Federal Judges Nomi-
nated by Donald Trump, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Federal_judges_nominated
_by_Donald_Trump [https://perma.cc/H7TS-CFAX].
7. Hawkins, supra note 6, at 31 (citations omitted).
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making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.8 These studies have focused on salient
public law issues, including employment discrimination, sexual harassment,
voting rights, environmental law, affirmative action, abortion, capital pun-
ishment, campaign finance, and federalism cases, among others.
However, the field has largely ignored procedural law, including class ac-
tions. Indeed, we have not been able to find a single empirical Court of Ap-
peals study seeking to evaluate the relationship between these judge
characteristics—or any other judge characteristics, or any other variables at
all—and decisions on class certification.
This is unfortunate because intuitions about judicial behavior, especially
as they relate to diversity, often provide a poor guide to reality. For example,
Court of Appeals studies have found no differences in decision making by
men and women in abortion and sexual harassment cases,9 or whites and
members of racial minorities in employment discrimination cases,10 or Re-
publican and Democratic appointees in cases addressing criminal appeals,
governmental takings of private property, and Commerce Clause challenges
to national legislation.11
Scholarly neglect of the possible influence of ideology is not surprising,
although it is regrettable, regarding procedural law in general. It is more puz-
zling with respect to class actions in particular, which have long been the sub-
ject of ideologically inflected debate. Class aggregation under Rule 23 can be a
vehicle for enormous regulatory power. Certification has the capacity to
transform a wage or consumer grievance over modest economic stakes that
would never be litigated individually into a claim for massive damages when
litigated on behalf of a class. In addition to providing the promise of a remedy
for large groups of persons when none would otherwise be practically availa-
ble, the prospect of certification can be an important feature of the regulatory
environment, shaping the behavior of defendants in favor of compliance.
Our prior work on the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting Federal
Rules that implicate private enforcement (including Rule 23) shows that be-
ginning in 1995 the justices’ votes in such cases were more strongly associated
8. See, e.g., HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 3; Boyd et al., supra note 4; Adam B. Cox &
Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008); Frank B. Cross &
Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing
on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro,
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Deci-
sion Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judi-
cial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167 (2013); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114
YALE L.J. 1759 (2005); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
9. See Boyd et al., supra note 4.
10. See Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8; Peresie, supra note 8.
11. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 149 (2006).
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with ideology than they were in merits votes.12 Particularly given increasing
attention to ideology in lower federal court appointments in recent decades,
our goals in collecting comprehensive data on class action decisions by the
Courts of Appeals included determining whether ideology plays a similar role
at that level.
The neglect of gender and race as possible influences on class-
certification decisions may reflect the apparent consensus that has emerged in
the literature on the Courts of Appeals that judges’ gender and race are asso-
ciated with variation in preferences only in a narrow band of cases directly
and explicitly implicating discrimination and inequality.13 Our prior work al-
so gave cause to question that assumption as to procedural law (like Rule 23)
that affects access to justice and does so across substantive domains, including
in particular discrimination and inequality.14
In Part I, we briefly review the literature on Court of Appeals decision
making that we build on. We emphasize two points. First, the literature shows
that when Court of Appeals judges’ party, gender, and race are associated
with votes, their primary explanatory power is at the panel level, meaning that
the composition of the panel often explains more variation in judges’ votes
than their own individual characteristics. The key point is that Court of Ap-
peals judges’ preferences (measured by characteristics) may influence out-
comes by the way they influence the votes of copanelists.
Second, studies focusing on discrete types of civil rights claims show that
panels with one woman or African American are more likely to produce pro-
civil rights outcomes as compared to panels with all men or all whites, provid-
ing systematic evidence that minority-group judges may influence outcomes
even when they are in the panel minority. By “minority group” we refer to
groups of judges that are a numerical minority on the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
such as women and nonwhites, regardless of their numbers in the general
population. We use the phrase “panel minority” to refer to a minority posi-
12. In order to reach this conclusion, we compared certification votes to merits votes in
the same policy areas that underlay our certification cases. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN
FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL
LITIGATION 170–80 (2017); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the
Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1526–28 (2017).
13. See infra notes 24, 27–30 and accompanying text; see also Peresie, supra note 8, at
1768 n.36 (“Although gender differences may exist in judges’ views of procedural doctrines,
procedural rulings are less likely to be affected by a judge’s gender.”).
14. Recognition of this reality did, however, cause two scholars to assimilate some proce-
dural rulings to merits rulings. See Sepehr Shahshahani & Lawrence J. Liu, Religion and Judging
on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 716, 723 (2017) (“Our object is to
gauge the attitude of judges to religious liberties claims, and there is no reason to think that this
attitude becomes uninteresting or entirely different when the issue before the court is procedur-
al. Quite the opposite, we know that judges use procedural doctrines to achieve substantive out-
comes they desire.” (citation omitted)). This study, however, provided no separate analysis of
procedural issues, and thus it does not allow inferences about whether their outcomes were as-
sociated with judge characteristics.
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tion on a panel that has divided preferences, regardless of whether the judge is
in a majority or minority group on the circuit.
In Part II, we review the theoretical accounts of appellate decision making
that provide possible explanations for panel dynamics when judges in the
panel minority in terms of preferences do and do not affect outcomes. This
theoretical literature is built on the empirical fact that Court of Appeals pan-
els are overwhelmingly unanimous. On one account, unanimity may be driv-
en by dissent avoidance by panel-minority judges who disagree with panel
majorities but do not dissent because of workload pressures, strong norms
against dissent, or the loneliness of dissent. These factors could lead to sup-
pression of dissents on panels on which there is sincere disagreement, and the
panel-majority view prevails without being influenced by the panel minority.
Alternatively, unanimity may be driven by panel minorities not dissent-
ing because they are able to affect decisions. Mechanisms of influence include
deliberation and bargaining, which allow panel minorities to change the pref-
erences and/or votes of panel majorities. As applied to minority-group judges,
this view yields more positive normative implications than if they were sup-
pressing dissents. It would allow minority-group preferences, when they dif-
fer systematically from majority-group preferences, to shape the application
and development of law even when they are in the panel minority. As already
noted, multiple studies focused on civil rights cases have found that a single
woman or African American can influence the votes of men and whites.
Part III contains our core contributions. We rely on an original and com-
prehensive dataset of Court of Appeals panel decisions addressing whether or
not to certify a class under Rule 23 that spans 1967 to 2017. We find a very
strong association between the political party of the appointing president and
certification votes and outcomes, with all-Democratic panels yielding procer-
tification outcomes at nearly triple the rate of all-Republican panels over
about the past twenty years. Comparing the descriptive levels of ideological
voting in our certification data to prior scholarship focused on substantive
law, we show that the role of ideology in certification is comparable in size to
its role in cases presenting some of the most ideologically contentious issues
of our day, including, for example, capital punishment, employment discrim-
ination, desegregation, and abortion. If the judicial-behavior literature’s ne-
glect of procedure in general, and class certification in particular, reflects an
assumption that the effects of judicial ideology do not reach into this domain
on the Courts of Appeals, we show that assumption to be false.
This Part goes on to show that racial and gender diversity on panels is al-
so consequential to certification, although we discern important differences
between the race and gender dynamics on panels. The presence of a single Af-
rican American on a panel, relative to none, increases the probability that the
panel will yield a procertification outcome. This result is consistent with the
race and gender panel-effects studies in which a single African American or
woman on a panel is associated with increases in the probability of pro-civil
rights outcomes. We have an insufficient number of cases with two African
Americans on a panel to assess the probability of procertification outcomes
on such panels.
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In notable contrast, the presence of a single woman on a panel, relative to
none, is not associated with an increased probability of a procertification out-
come. This does not mean, however, that women do not have more procerti-
fication preferences. When two women serve on a panel, forming a majority,
its rate of procertification outcomes is much larger than on panels with three
men. This result departs sharply from conventional wisdom in the Court of
Appeals literature that when women or members of racial minorities have dif-
ferent preferences than men and whites, some pathway (or pathways) allows
them to influence outcomes when in the minority.
We regard this result as normatively troubling. As a function of the laws
of probability, minority-group judges on a circuit will be in the majority on
panels at rates far lower than their fraction of judgeships. The share of panels
with women in the majority in our data is about half the share of individual
votes cast by women. The majoritarian character of gender panel dynamics in
certification decisions—where women in the panel minority do not influence
the outcome votes of men in the majority, and women’s impact emerges only
when they are in the majority—materially dilutes women’s influence on certi-
fication relative to their numbers on the bench, a bench that already un-
derrepresents women.
These results highlight some important limits of Court of Appeals schol-
arship which concludes that, in many discrete policy areas, women and mem-
bers of racial minorities do not have different preferences than men and
whites. The inferences in these studies (every one that we have found) were
drawn from empirical models in which the individual-level votes of minority-
group judges were not different from majority-group judges and/or the pres-
ence of one minority-group judge did not produce distinguishable outcomes
relative to all–majority group panels. However, the researchers did not sepa-
rately evaluate panels with a majority of minority-group judges and/or lacked
a sufficient number of such cases to support meaningful inferences about
such panels.
Earlier studies appear to have assumed that, if minority-group judges had
different preferences than majority-group judges, they would affect minority-
group judge votes, or case outcomes, rather than being suppressed by majori-
tarian voting dynamics (or some other mechanism). Our gender results show
that this assumption is sometimes false, and thus differences in minority-
group judges’ preferences cannot be rejected without separately examining
cases in which they are in the majority. Unfortunately, meaningful analysis
for that purpose requires a lot of data.
Neither our data nor prior panel-effects scholarship allow us to identify
the reasons for the different preferences of women and African Americans as
to class certification or, in the case of gender, why two women on a panel as
opposed to one are associated with higher rates of procertification voting and
outcomes. We do, however, offer suggestions on both questions as a possible
guide for additional research.
As transsubstantive procedural law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply across substantive domains and can enable or constrict access to justice.
A controlling interpretation of a Federal Rule in an antitrust case, for exam-
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ple, will carry over into its application in a voting rights case. One important
insight of this Article is that the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules
can also convey the substantive effects of diversity across the landscape of
American regulatory law. Court of Appeals judges understand that the Feder-
al Rules are transsubstantive, as are the effects of some Federal Rules (im-
portantly including Rule 23) on the enforcement of substantive law. As
strategic actors, it would be rational for them to take into consideration how
class-certification doctrine in a case that does not implicate issues on which
they have strong preferences might affect certification in cases that do. Alter-
natively, or in addition, our results may be the first evidence that transsub-
stantive procedural law affecting access to justice is itself a policy domain in
which women and African Americans have distinctive preferences.
Our suggestions regarding mechanisms that may help to explain why two
women on a panel, but not one, are associated with higher rates of procertifi-
cation voting and outcomes are more speculative and tentative. One explana-
tion is familiar in the literature on panel effects. Men may simply care
intensely about certification and have views so entrenched that their votes
cannot be influenced and majoritarian dynamics prevail. Yet, we observe that
a single African American is associated with elevating the rate of procertifica-
tion outcomes. This leads us to consider recent scholarship on the gender gap
in political discussions and decision making, which suggests some disquieting
possibilities. If the dynamics identified by this research are at play, one possi-
bility is that a woman in the minority who advocates for a preferred outcome
is less successful because, as a panel minority in a substantive domain that
does not elicit gender-based deference, she is regarded as less authoritative
and influential. Another is that the reinforcement of another woman increas-
es her propensity to advocate preferences that differ systematically from those
of her male colleagues in areas without obvious gender salience.
I. PANEL EFFECTS ON THE COURT OF APPEALS
From the dawn of the judicial-behavior literature until the late 1990s, ju-
dicial-politics scholars studied such questions on appellate courts by evaluat-
ing, for example, whether a judge’s presumed ideological preferences (as
proxied by the party of the appointing president), race, or gender was associ-
ated with her votes in cases thought to have high policy salience. These stud-
ies were based largely on the attitudinal model of decision making.15 The
attitudinal model is oriented to explaining judicial decision making based on
“each judge’s political ideology and the identity of the parties.”16 This indi-
vidualist orientation emphasizes the explanatory power of each judge’s sin-
cere preferences independently of strategic institutional considerations or of
interactions with colleagues.
15. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
16. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265 (1997).
240 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:231
Beginning with landmark studies by Revesz17 and Cross and Tiller,18
scholars discovered that the votes of judges on three-judge Court of Appeals
panels in many salient policy areas are associated with the identity character-
istics of their panel colleagues. These initial studies found that Court of Ap-
peals judges’ votes were influenced by the party of the appointing president of
other judges on the panel.19 These insights into panel dynamics were then ex-
tended to work on the influence of judges’ gender and race. A number of
studies found that in employment discrimination cases, men serving on
three-judge Court of Appeals panels with one woman were more likely to rule
for the plaintiff than men serving on panels with two other men.20 Similarly,
one study found that in voting rights cases whites on an appellate panel were
more likely to vote in favor of liability when sitting with one member of a ra-
cial minority,21 and another found that in affirmative action cases whites were
more likely to vote in the pro-affirmative action direction when sitting with
one African American on the panel.22
In the next section, when outlining a theoretical framework for under-
standing potential panel dynamics in the face of disagreement, we assume
that in some areas of law systematic differences exist in preferences across
groups of Court of Appeals judges, such as Democratic versus Republican ap-
pointees, whites versus nonwhites (or other racial subsets), or men versus
women. We make this stylized assumption because it is the purpose of the
framework to help understand the processes through which differences in
preferences on panels are associated with legal outcomes, including differ-
ences in preferences associated with judges’ identity characteristics such as
race and gender. By assuming that judges’ race and gender may be associated
with their views of the proper disposition of cases in some fields of law, we do
not indulge the facile notion that women or racial minority judges have ho-
mogeneous preferences. We do not believe that there is a monolithic women’s
perspective, or racial minority perspective, among judges. We do believe,
however, that in some domains of law race and gender may be one constitu-
tive element of a judge’s views. The same is true of ideology.23
17. Revesz, supra note 8.
18. Cross & Tiller, supra note 8.
19. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007);
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11.
20. See Boyd et al., supra note 4; Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8; Peresie, supra note 8.
21. Cox & Miles, supra note 8, at 45.
22. See Kastellec, supra note 8. A recent study focusing on judges’ religion, however,
shows that panel effects will not always be present when there are detectable individual-level
differences in preferences across groups. The study found that, although Jewish judges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals were more likely to rule for the plaintiff in Establishment Clause cases,
the votes of non-Jewish colleagues on the panel were not affected. See Shahshahani & Liu, supra
note 14.
23. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 12, at 149–50 (“To attribute the Court’s deci-
sions exclusively to the ideological preferences of the justices, however, would neglect ‘the mess-
iness of lived experience’ . . . which teaches that judges . . . make decisions based on a number of
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The social scientific evidence relied on throughout this Article provides
support for this view. Yet, as previously noted, research on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals civil docket that finds variation along gender or racial lines has clus-
tered heavily in areas relating to discrimination and inequality, and such vari-
ation has sometimes been absent even in those areas.24 In Boyd, Epstein, and
Martin’s widely cited study on gender, they undertake discrete analyses of the
association of Court of Appeals judges’ gender and their votes in thirteen sep-
arate policy areas.25 They report that women vote differently, and influence
men, in only one—gender-based employment discrimination claims.26
They find that women do not vote differently than men in numerous are-
as that have no explicit gender salience and do not explicitly implicate issues
of discrimination, such as campaign finance, federalism, piercing the corpo-
rate veil, Takings Clause, and environmental cases. Perhaps more surprisingly
to some observers, they also find that women do not vote differently than
men in some areas that do implicate gender and discrimination, including
abortion, sexual harassment, and affirmative action. Ultimately, their inter-
pretation is that women vote differently, and influence men, in domains in
which they “possess unique and valuable information emanating from shared
considerations, including the law as they understand it.” (quoting Stephen B. Burbank, On the
Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science, and Humility, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO
WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 41, 53 (Charles Gardner
Geyh ed., 2011))); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Ap-
peals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1322 n.11 (2009) (“The
fact that judges’ votes correlate with party affiliation does not mean that they are not following
legal doctrine. Legal rules are inevitably ‘open textured,’ allowing for the exercise of judgment.
In those areas where legal discretion exists, judges may pursue policy goals without necessarily
violating legal norms.” (quoting Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,
410 (2007))).
24. See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 3, at 28–32 (finding that African Americans do not
vote more liberally than whites on the Courts of Appeals when data is pooled over many policy
areas, but they do in employment discrimination cases if the data is restricted to claims based
upon race, and (weakly) in criminal cases); Cox & Miles, supra note 8, at 30, 43 (finding that a
judge’s race, but not gender, is associated with higher likelihood of voting in favor of liability in
voting rights cases on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 321 (find-
ing that judge’s gender, but not race, is associated with more liberal voting and outcomes in em-
ployment discrimination claims on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Kastellec, supra note 8, at 175
(finding that a judge’s race, but not gender, is associated with higher likelihood of voting in fa-
vor of affirmative action programs on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Peresie, supra note 8, at 1774,
1776 (same); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morris, Searching for the Soul of Judi-
cial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491,
595–96 (2004) (finding that a judge’s race, but not gender, is associated with higher likelihood of
voting in favor of plaintiffs alleging religious discrimination on the U.S. Courts of Appeals).
25. Boyd et al., supra note 4, at 400–06.
26. Several other studies find that women are more pro-plaintiff in adjudicating em-
ployment discrimination claims in general, not just gender-based claims. See Farhang & Wawro,
supra note 8; Peresie, supra note 8; Donald R. Songer, Sue Davis & Susan Haire, A Reappraisal of
Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425
(1994). Boyd, Epstein, and Martin provide no test of employment discrimination claims in gen-
eral. Boyd et al., supra note 4.
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professional experiences.”27 Surveying the literature on gender and judging,
and reporting the results from their own large-scale study, Haire and Moyer
similarly conclude that “issues of sex discrimination” are “[t]he single excep-
tion” to the general rule that “women judges . . . decide cases similarly to their
male colleagues.”28
II. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS: THE NORM
OF UNANIMITY
The panel-effects literature makes clear that understanding decision mak-
ing on the U.S. Courts of Appeals requires attention to the institutional con-
text of three-judge appellate panels. This is especially true when studying the
influence of a minority group on the appellate bench. By “minority group” we
refer to groups of judges that are a numerical minority on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, such as women and nonwhites, regardless of their numbers in the
general population. We use the phrase “panel minority” to refer to a minority
position on a panel that has divided preferences, regardless of whether the
judge is in a majority or minority group on the circuit. In federal trial courts,
a minority-group trial judge sitting alone has the authority to decide a case as
she sees fit (with the obvious constraint of appellate review). On three-judge
appellate panels, where a simple majority prevails, a single minority-group
judge sitting with two members of the majority group lacks the power to de-
cide anything. The two judges in the majority group are free to issue binding
decisions that wholly reject the views of the minority.
This is normatively significant in the Court of Appeals context because
the frequency with which a circuit minority will constitute a panel majority is
materially lower than their representation on the circuit. For example, under
random assignment in a circuit with fifteen judges, of whom two are mem-
bers of racial minorities (13%), the probability of drawing a panel that has two
members of racial minorities is about 3%. If three members of the circuit are
women (20%), women will be in the majority on only 8% of panels.29 Only
when a group approaches half of the appellate bench will its members be in
the majority about half the time. As compared with trial courts, in which each
case is heard by one judge, the use of three-judge appellate panels threatens to
significantly diminish the influence of minority-group judges in areas in
which minority and majority views differ systematically. In Pitkin’s terms,
appellate panels may dilute translation of descriptive representation into sub-
stantive representation.30
27. Boyd et al., supra note 4, at 391–92, 401. It seems that an informational explanation
for women’s different preferences, and their influence on men, in employment discrimination
cases in their data (which exclude sexual harassment cases) should extend to sexual harassment
cases (which are overwhelmingly employment discrimination claims).
28. HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 3, at 48.
29. This result comes from the hypergeometric distribution.
30. See PITKIN, supra note 1.
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This bleak consequence of appellate-court structure seems the likely out-
come in fields of law characterized by differences in preferences across major-
ity and minority-group judges if (1) judges’ preferences on case disposition
are not affected by their colleagues on the panel, and (2) they vote their sin-
cere preferences. In that event, majority-group judges will decide those cases
in the same way regardless of whether their majority is 3–0 or 2-1. Where the
panel is split 2–1 in favor of the majority group, the decision of the majority-
group judges will not be influenced by the minority-group judge. The minori-
ty-group view will prevail only in cases in which two or three minority judges
are assigned to the panel. Finally, this simple theoretical account predicts
higher rates of dissent among minority-group judges when they serve with
two majority-group judges, and among majority-group judges in the rare cas-
es in which they serve with two minority-group judges.
Median voter behavior on appellate panels would yield the same result.
Under this view, “it is the preferences of the median member of the judicial
panel that should determine the panel’s decision.”31 Under the stylized condi-
tions assumed above, on panels with two majority-group judges and one mi-
nority-group judge, a majority-group judge will always be the median, and
minority-group judges therefore will not influence outcomes unless they are
in the majority on the panel. Again, we would expect to see higher rates of
dissent by panel minorities (whether they are a majority- or minority-group
judge).
Moving from stylized theory to empirical reality, decisions by federal ap-
pellate panels are in fact overwhelmingly unanimous, with dissent rates re-
ported in past studies averaging approximately 3% to 9%, varying over time
and with respect to issue area.32 These low dissent rates prevail even within
particularly contentious issue areas, where measures of panel outcomes are
highly correlated with ideology. That is, even in substantive areas of law char-
acterized by systematic ideological disagreement among Court of Appeals
judges across cases, within cases the same judges achieve a remarkably high
level of unanimity. The evidence thus suggests that panel unanimity masks
disagreement among panel members.
What happens to the views of the panel minority on divided panels? Are
panel-minority dissents being suppressed without influencing the content of
the panel’s decision? Or are panel-minority dissents avoided through a pro-
31. See Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Ad-
ministrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 74 n.31 (2002); see also Eric R. Claeys, Note, The Article
III, Section 2 Games: A Game-Theoretic Account of Standing and Other Justiciability Doctrines,
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321, 1331–32 (1994).
32. See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 47
(2006); DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 105 (2000); Burton M. Atkins & Justin J.
Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI.
735 (1976); Daniel A. Farber, Essay, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case
Study, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 1430 n.120 (2000).
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cess in which minority judges influence the content of the panel decision? A
variety of theories have been advanced to explain panel unanimity, which is
sufficiently prevalent that scholars regard it as a “norm” on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.33
A. Suppressed Dissent Explanations for the Norm of Unanimity
One set of explanations suggests that Court of Appeals judges often ac-
quiesce in (join) opinions with which they disagree while having no influence
on their substance. Unanimity is maintained in the face of disagreement due
to (1) workload pressures, (2) a coercive-consensus norm, or (3) the loneli-
ness of dissent. These explanations have been referred to collectively as “sup-
pressed dissent” hypotheses for the unanimity norm on the Courts of Ap-
Appeals.34
First, many Court of Appeals judges face substantial workloads. Having
peaked in 2006, filings averaged 335 per judge in active service in 2010.35 Fac-
ing heavy workloads simply to write majority opinions that they are assigned
to author, Court of Appeals judges have observed that it is often not feasible
for nonwriting judges to invest time to influence the content of opinions that
they join.36 This is consistent with the notion that heavy caseloads on the
Courts of Appeals are associated with disproportionate deference to opinion
authors regarding opinion content.37 In such an environment, Court of Ap-
peals judges are often constrained from taking on the extra work of writing
dissents, which they of course recognize will not directly influence circuit
law.38 Hence, the absence of dissents does not arise from panel consensus, but
33. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 19, at 305–07; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 69; Kim,
supra note 23, at 1331; John P. McIver, Scaling Judicial Decisions: The Panel Decisionmaking
Process of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 749, 757 (1976).
34. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 306. For a thoughtful recent discussion of dissent
in multimembered courts by a federal appellate judge, see Bernice B. Donald, Judicial Independ-
ence, Collegiality, and the Problem of Dissent in Multi-Member Courts, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 317
(2019).
35. Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management
in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 324 (2011). This declined to 292 in 2018. See Email from
Marin Levy, Professor of L., Duke Univ. Sch. of L. to Stephen Burbank, David Berger Professor
for the Admin. of Just., Univ. of Pa. Carey Sch. of L. (June 9, 2019) (on file with the Michigan
Law Review). As Professor Levy acknowledges, this is “an imperfect measure of workload,” be-
cause “[i]t does not account for the contribution of senior judges, and therefore overestimates. It
also does not account for the number of vacancies on the court, and therefore can underesti-
mate.” Id.
36. See FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE BENCH 178 (1980); Pierre N. Leval, Madison Lecture, Judging Under the Constitu-
tion: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1262 (2006).
37. See Sean Farhang, Jonathan P. Kastellec & Gregory J. Wawro, The Politics of Opinion
Assignment and Authorship on the US Court of Appeals: Evidence from Sexual Harassment Cases,
44 J. LEGAL STUD. S59, S62 (2015); Steven A. Peterson, Dissent in American Courts, 43 J. POL.
412, 415–16 (1981).
38. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 65; Atkins & Green, supra note 32.
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rather from judges who disagree lacking the time or resources needed to rec-
ord a dissent.
Second, according to the coercive-consensus norm, “social pressure ex-
ists . . . for the judge to adhere to the dominant value or position expressed in
a decision.”39 Some contend that this norm is rooted in the view that unani-
mous opinions promote the appearance of legal objectivity, certainty, and
neutrality, which promotes courts’ institutional legitimacy, while dissenting
opinions create legal uncertainty, erode courts’ credibility, and may diminish
compliance.40 Even absent explicit pressure, such institutional concerns may
cause judges to forgo dissents out of a sense of “organizational loyalty.”41
Third, some scholars maintain that judges who disagree with a panel de-
cision may refrain from dissent, in part, because of the “intrinsic loneliness of
dissent.”42 As the size of the court increases, so does the possibility for dis-
senters to join together and express collective disagreement, making dissent
more collegial and appealing.43 Thus, the three-judge panel, where dissents
are always solitary, is the institutional environment in which the loneliness of
dissent is most likely consequential as a mechanism contributing to panel
unanimity.44
To the extent that any or all of the suppressed-dissent hypotheses are op-
erative, institutional conditions on the Courts of Appeals may inhibit panel
minorities who disagree with panel majorities from articulating disagreement.
Within areas of law where the views of majority- and minority-group judges
differ systematically, this would produce normatively troubling results. Panel
unanimity would be masking two things: (1) the failure of minority-group
judges to shape the application and development of law proportionately with
their numbers on the Court of Appeals, and (2) the disproportionate suppres-
sion of the dissenting views of minority-group judges.45
39. Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Towards Conformity in a Three
Member Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 54 SOC.
SCI. Q. 41, 43 (1973); see also SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 65–66.
40. See HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 32, at 19; Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 307;
Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1639, 1651 (2003).
41. Peterson, supra note 37, at 416–17.
42. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 64–71; Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 307;
Donald R. Songer, Consensual and Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the Unit-
ed States Courts of Appeals, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 225, 227 (1982).
43. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); S. Sidney Ulmer,
Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States Supreme Court, 27 J. POL. 133
(1965).
44. See Justin J. Green & Burton M. Atkins, Designated Judges: How Well Do They Per-
form?, 61 JUDICATURE 358, 368 (1978).
45. We say disproportionate suppression because, as a result of the hypergeometric func-
tion described above, minority judges will be in the panel minority, relative to their percentage
of seats, much more than judges with a larger share of seats. Thus, if any of the suppressed-
dissent hypotheses is correct, the silencing effect will fall most heavily on minority groups.
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B. Modified Content Explanations for the Norm of Unanimity
There is another set of explanations for the high degree of unanimity on
the Courts of Appeals, which contemplates that withholding of dissents by
panel minorities entails modification of the majority opinion in the direction
of the would-be dissenter’s preferences. This view yields more positive nor-
mative implications for how minority-group preferences, when they differ
systematically from majority-group preferences, are mediated into the appli-
cation and development of law. The explanations are (1) deliberation, (2) cue
taking, and (3) bargaining. We refer to these explanations for the norm of
unanimity, collectively, as “modified content” explanations.46 In contrast with
a simple majoritarian model of appellate panels, where each judge’s prefer-
ences are unaffected by their colleagues and all vote to decide according to
their sincere preferences, now a lone judge in the minority is able to influence
application and development of law on the Court of Appeals. Of course, lead-
ing colleagues to change their votes on outcome is a very strong form of con-
tent modification.
The deliberative explanation for panel effects is about rational persuasion
through the exchange of ideas and information. Judges take the perspectives,
arguments, and information presented by one another seriously in the delib-
erative process, and this can cause judges on a heterogeneous panel, who ex-
change information and arguments from a wider range of perspectives than
occurs on a homogeneous panel, to change their views in the course of delib-
erations.47 The contention that this process explains panel effects is anchored
in two premises. The first is that the judge characteristic producing the panel
effect (such as ideology, race, or gender) will be associated with bringing dis-
tinctive perspectives, arguments, and information to bear in the deliberative
process. As Sunstein et al. put it, a more diverse panel will likely have a larger
“argument pool” than a more homogeneous one, meaning that a wider range
of arguments “are far more likely to emerge and to be pressed.”48
The second premise is that when a panel is divided 2–1 regarding the best
disposition, the two members of the panel majority can be persuaded with ar-
guments and information provided by the single minority judge to decide dif-
ferently than they would in her absence. According to Sunstein et al., “group
polarization” on three-judge panels, where like-minded judges on homogene-
ous panels reinforce one another’s positions and go to extremes, can be miti-
gated by persuasive arguments and information offered by the panel
minority. Breaking “group polarization” involves the process of persuasion
through the introduction of arguments and information that would otherwise
46. See Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 308.
47. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11; Edwards, supra note 40; Lewis A. Kornhauser &
Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1
(1993).
48. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 76.
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be absent.49 Panel effects may thus be explained by “rational persuasion with-
in the group” causing the majority to change its assessment of “the best un-
derstanding of the law” (or facts).50
The panel characteristics that were the focus of these arguments by Sun-
stein et al., Cross, and Edwards were based on the political party of appoint-
ing presidents.51 The deliberative account was offered to explain why, for ex-
example, two judges appointed by Republicans sitting with a judge appointed
by a Democrat decide more moderately than three judges appointed by Re-
publicans. Sunstein et al. in particular regard it as a normatively desirable fea-
ture of appellate panels that they can mitigate decision making characterized
by “group polarization” on homogeneous panels (all Republican or all Demo-
cratic).52 The same logic can be applied to the gender or racial diversity of
panels to explain panel effects. In some types of cases, women and members
of racial minorities may bring distinctive perspectives or information to bear
in the deliberative process and persuade men or white judges to decide differ-
ently than they would on panels with three men or three white judges.53
Another mechanism that scholars have offered to explain panel effects is
“cue taking.” Cue taking is a dynamic whereby some judges, seeking an effi-
cient path to rendering a decision, show greater deference to other judges in
issue domains in which they are perceived to be more credible or expert.54
Although this mechanism does not seem to be a plausible explanation for par-
ty panel effects, it has been invoked to explain gender panel effects in “gen-
der-coded cases.”55 Social psychological research has found that in areas in
which men perceive women as more knowledgeable, they are more prone to
defer to their judgment.56 The studies finding gender panel effects have exam-
ined employment discrimination cases, and several of them have proposed
cue taking as a plausible explanation.57 A study finding race panel effects in
affirmative action cases also proposed something akin to cue taking as a pos-
sible explanatory mechanism.58
49. See id. at 71–73.
50. CROSS, supra note 19, at 154–55; see also SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 73; Ed-
wards, supra note 40, at 1656–61.
51. CROSS, supra note 19, at 11; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at ix; Edwards, supra
note 40, at 1645.
52. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 138.
53. See Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 308; Kastellec, supra note 8, at 171.
54. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 31 (2002).
55. Peresie, supra note 8, at 1783.
56. See Marlaine E. Lockheed, Sex and Social Influence: A Meta-Analysis Guided by Theo-
ry, in STATUS, REWARDS, AND INFLUENCE: HOW EXPECTATIONS ORGANIZE BEHAVIOR 406, 409–
10 (Joseph Berger & Morris Zelditch, Jr. eds., 1985); Barbara F. Meeker & Patricia A. Weitzel-
O’Neill, Sex Roles and Interpersonal Behavior in Task-Oriented Groups, in STATUS, REWARDS,
AND INFLUENCE, supra, at 379, 390–91.
57. See, e.g., Boyd et al., supra note 4, at 392; Peresie, supra note 8, at 1783–84.
58. See Kastellec, supra note 8, at 171–72 (observing that the mere presence of an African
American in an affirmative action case, independent of the content of deliberations, and inde-
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We see this account as potentially complementary to the deliberative ex-
planation for panel effects associated with minority-group judges. Like the
deliberative explanation, cue taking can include the notion that in some poli-
cy domains minority-group judges have different preferences, take different
positions in panel deliberations, and influence majority-group judges. The
difference is that cue-taking theory suggests a cognitive process of deference
to perceived credibility and expertise rather than pure rational evaluation of
the perspective offered (although of course deference to expertise can be ra-
tional). We agree with scholars who posit that the most plausible account of
cue taking by Court of Appeals judges is that they give greater weight to the
views of judges they regard as more credible and expert, rather than following
them with abject deference.59 Thus, if the deliberative account is operative,
and if whites and males view colleagues who are members of racial minorities
and women as having greater expertise in race- and gender-coded cases, then
the cue-taking effect would heighten and reinforce the deliberative effect.
The bargaining explanation for panel effects contemplates that panel mi-
norities, aided by the norm of unanimity, extract concessions from panel ma-
jorities, rather than changing their minds. Contrary to the deliberative
explanation, the panel minority does not change the majority’s “best under-
standing of the law.” Rather, panel majorities strategically change their posi-
tion in a bargaining process calculated to avert a dissent and achieve
unanimity.
In work on strategic judicial behavior, scholars have found considerable
evidence that Supreme Court justices are often willing to bargain away from
their ideal positions for the purpose of enlarging the coalition of justices who
will join an opinion.60 Similar dynamics have been observed on three-judge
federal appellate panels.61 These studies focused on strategic concessions by
judges necessary to achieve a majority. It is also plausible that concessions will
be made to enlarge a majority (beyond a bare majority) by judges who value
the appearance of apolitical and neutral decision making, who want to pro-
mote legal clarity and predictability, or who are concerned about compli-
ance.62
pendent of her vote, may influence the behavior of whites on the panel). Boyd et al. suggest the
same possibility with respect to gender, and they liken this to cue taking. Boyd et al., supra note
4, at 392 n.8.
59. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 559
(2008).
60. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9–14 (1998); FORREST
MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 1–15 (2000); see also MURPHY, supra note 43, at 56–60.
61. See Ryan J. Owens & Ryan C. Black, Strategic Bargaining on the United States Courts
of Appeals, SSRN (Jan. 26, 2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1568355 [https://perma.cc/4E3Y-
3MAM].
62. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 107–08 (1997);
HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 32, at 19; Edwards, supra note 40, at 1651.
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A related but distinct idea is that would-be dissenters can threaten to
“blow the whistle” (with a dissent) on a majority if it strays from governing
law, thereby attracting appellate review. With this threat the panel minority
can gain concessions in opinion content.63 It is a form of bargaining, but the
majority’s goal is to avoid reversal rather than to secure institutional goals of
legitimacy, clarity, or compliance. This tactic may be most likely to work
when the panel majority is ideologically distant from the circuit en banc or
the Supreme Court.64 Whether concessions are motivated by the institutional
costs of dissents or by fear of reversal, “[s]ince judges often desire unanimity
or, at least, as large a majority as possible, the threat of dissent can be used to
gain” them.65
If any of these modified-content explanations is operative, panel unanim-
ity need not entail suppression of dissents. Instead, high levels of unanimity
would result from substantive modifications of the panel majority’s initial
view of a case based upon deliberation, cue taking, or bargaining. As applied
to issues on which majority- and minority-group judges differ systematically,
the actual operation of modified-content explanations would yield optimistic
conclusions about the substantive representation of minority-group judges. In
contrast with a scenario in which panel outcomes reflect simple majoritarian
processes, or dominance of the median, institutional features of appellate
panels would function to facilitate rather than impede substantive minority
representation.
The panel-effects studies discussed above relating to race (affirmative ac-
tion and voting rights cases) and gender (employment discrimination cases)
were consistent with modified-content explanations, although they could not
determine which explanatory mechanism(s) were at work.66 A single African
American sitting with two whites, and a single woman sitting with two men,
affected the votes of majority-group judges in favor of affirmative action, lia-
bility under the Voting Rights Act, and employment discrimination plaintiffs.
Within case types in which there are systematic differences in preferences
across groups of judges—Democrats versus Republicans, women versus men,
African Americans versus whites—three-judge Court of Appeals panels fre-
quently do not operate on a simple majoritarian principle under which judges
vote their preferences independently from their interactions with others on
the panel. Instead, in some types of cases, judges in the ideological, gender, or
racial minority are able to influence the votes of the panel majority.
63. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 8, at 2159, 2174.
64. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals, 73 J. POL. 345, 360 (2011); Kim, supra note 23, at 1328.
65. Peterson, supra note 37, at 418.
66. See Kastellec, supra note 8, at 172; see also Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 14, at 739
(“[O]ur finding suggests that panel effects (where they do exist) cannot come entirely through
the minority judge’s threat of voting the other way because such an explanation cannot account
for an individual characteristic that changes the minority judge’s vote but not the co-
panelists’.”).
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C. Two Types of Panel Effects
The foregoing discussion of suppressed-dissent and modified-content
theories highlights that there are two types of panel effects. As observed by
Professor Kim with respect to ideology, “the phenomenon of ‘panel effects’
encompasses two distinct effects: first, that judges in the majority vote differ-
ently (in a less stereotypically ideological fashion) than judges on a homoge-
neous panel; and second, that judges in the minority vote differently (still less
stereotypically ideologically) than judges in the majority.”67 Sunstein et al.
characterize the first of these—the ability of the minority to draw the majority
toward her—as an “ideological dampening” effect, relative to the tendency of
unified panels to go to extremes.68
Although it is possible that the two types of panel effects will occur to-
gether—with the majority and minority reciprocally panel affecting one an-
other—it is not logically necessary that they will. Sunstein et al. argue that
ideological dampening of majorities by minorities will vary across policy do-
mains and is less likely to occur in those, such as abortion and capital pun-
ishment, in which judges have intense and “entrenched” preferences,
undercutting the ability of partisan panel minorities to influence majorities.69
It is plausible, as a matter of theory, that in such policy domains the votes of
panel minorities can be influenced in the direction of the majority for any of
the suppressed-dissent reasons (e.g., workload, consensus norms), while at
the same time the majority is not dampened. On this view, voting in policy
domains characterized by intense and entrenched views is more likely to be
majoritarian.
In a study of gender and race panel effects in employment discrimination
cases, Farhang and Wawro observed that if this majoritarian dynamic were
operative, the sincere preferences of women and racial minority judges would
only become visible (to researchers) when they are in the majority. Farhang
and Wawro wrote:
If we find that the probability of an outcome in favor of a civil rights
plaintiff does not increase when one minority serves on a panel but does in-
crease when two serve, this would be evidence in favor of the suppressed dis-
sent hypotheses. We would interpret this result as indicating that the more
liberal votes of minority judges when they are in a majority better represent
their sincere preferences, which are not influencing outcomes when only one
serves on a panel.70
67. Kim, supra note 23, at 1330–31; see also Kastellec, supra note 64, at 349.
68. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 8–9.
69. Id. at 62–63, 69–70. Using different methods and improved data, Professor Fischman
finds that there are panel effects in capital punishment and abortion cases. Joshua B. Fischman,
Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework, 31 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 808, 829 (2015). Our point here is conceptual and not about Sunstein et al.’s specific em-
pirical claims.
70. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 310.
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III. DATA, MODELS, AND ANALYSIS
This project is part of a larger study of decision making by federal Courts
of Appeals on issues of class certification. We examine both published and
unpublished cases. With respect to published (precedential) cases, we en-
deavored to build a comprehensive dataset of federal Court of Appeals panel
decisions addressing whether a class should be certified from 1966, when the
modern Rule 23 became effective, through 2017.71 With respect to un-
published (nonprecedential) cases, we collected the same data from 2002, by
which time nearly all unpublished cases appeared in the Federal Appendix,
through 2017.72 In total, we identified 1,344 certification decisions.
Of course, published Court of Appeals decisions differ from unpublished
decisions in important respects, and published decisions are not representa-
tive of all litigated cases.73 We can learn from both types of decisions. We are
interested, in part, in the influence of ideological and identity characteristics
of judges, if any, on the creation and development of law. Published Court of
Appeals opinions are the vehicle through which circuits create and develop
law that is binding on all subsequent panels and on all district courts in the
circuit, while unpublished decisions have no precedential weight. In initial
models we will examine only published opinions.
We are also interested in the full universe of decided certification appeals.
In addition to the possible unrepresentativeness of published cases with re-
spect to judicial behavior, there may be other selection processes at play when
analyzing only published opinions. The same judges that render decisions in
published cases also decide whether the case will be published, threatening to
confound inferences about the relationship between judge characteristics and
case outcomes when one studies only published cases. Thus, we also examine
models of published and unpublished cases restricted to the circuit years in
which we have complete data on both. In those models, the results look very
similar to what we observe when analyzing only published cases.
Our dependent variable is whether a decision is pro- or anticertification.
In order to code it, the certification analysis in each decision was read in full.
We code a decision as procertification (=1) if the Court of Appeals affirms the
trial court’s certification, reverses the trial court’s decision not to certify and
directs it to certify, or reverses the trial court’s decision not to certify and re-
71. See Appendix, Section I.A, for further details on data collection.
72. See Appendix, Section I.A, for further details on data collection. We say “nearly” all
unpublished decisions because the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ unpublished decisions did not
consistently appear in the Federal Appendix until 2003 and 2005, respectively. See Andrew T.
Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical Problems & Legal
Malpractice?, 26 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 185, 205–06 (2007). As discussed in Section I.A of the Ap-
pendix, our models that include unpublished opinions account for this.
73. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal
Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1989); David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideol-
ogy, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 843 (2005); Debo-
rah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001).
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mands for further proceedings on certification. We code a case as anticertifi-
cation (=0) if the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court’s decision not to cer-
tify, reverses the trial court’s decision to certify and directs that a class not be
certified, or reverses the trial court’s decision to certify and remands for fur-
ther proceedings on certification.
The task of measuring how a judge or panel characteristic may influence
lawmaking is difficult. The most clearly observable manifestation of influence
is an increase in the probability of a decision in favor of or against certifica-
tion. However, much bargaining and deliberation among judges focuses on
how to frame or justify a decision once it has been determined which party
will prevail.74 Such decisions about framing and justification can have im-
portant ramifications for the actual policy consequences of an opinion for fu-
ture cases. Although we believe that our dependent variable captures much
that is important to the creation and development of the law governing certi-
fication under Rule 23, we readily acknowledge its limits, which we regard as
one cost of a large-N empirical study, as compared to a qualitative study that
examines not just outcomes but also the scope and implications of reasoning.
This measurement constraint limits the inferences we can make from our
data. If we find that some judge or panel characteristic is not associated with
either pro- or anticertification voting, we cannot conclude that the judge or
panel characteristic has no directional influence on opinion content. On the
other hand, as previously noted, flipping an outcome is a very strong form of
influence, and thus to the extent that we find that a judge or panel characteris-
tic is associated with a decision on certification in a particular direction, that
characteristic is likely influencing opinion content in the same direction in
more subtle ways.
For each case, we identified the party,75 gender, and race of each judge us-
ing the Federal Judicial Center’s biographical database.76 With respect to race,
our models focus on whether African Americans have different voting behav-
ior than whites and other judges, with “other” being Hispanic, Asian Ameri-
can, and Native American. Numerous past studies finding that race is
associated with Court of Appeals judges’ voting have focused, in whole or in
part, on African Americans as a discrete category.77 We also examined alter-
native specifications of all models presented in this Article (not displayed),
pooling all nonwhites into a single racial minority category and comparing
them to whites. In those models, we found no statistically significant differ-
74. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 60, at 65–70.
75. Again, we use party of the appointing president as a proxy for judges’ ideological
preferences.
76. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/8HHF-JYZ9].
77. See, e.g., HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 3, at 28–32; Cox & Miles, supra note 8; Kas-
tellec, supra note 8; Jonathan P. Kastellec, Race, Context and Judging on the Courts of Appeals:
Race-Based Panel Effects in Death Penalty Cases, SSRN (July 26, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2594946 [https://perma.cc/5QYH-9P6Q].
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ences at either the individual or the panel level.78 The race differences we re-
port are distinctive to African Americans.
The inferences we draw from the party, gender, and race variables are
based on the assumption that case assignment to panels is random, or “as-if”
random, regarding the relationship between panel composition and the mer-
its of the motion for class certification.79 We incorporate a battery of control
variables that include a variety of case characteristics, which are detailed in
Part I.B of the Appendix. The models also contain circuit fixed effects and
year fixed effects.
Circuit fixed effects account for any variables that change across circuits
that would take the same value for each judge on a panel within that circuit,
such as circuit doctrine that may have a pro- or anticertification slant and var-
iation in the size and content of caseloads across circuits. Year fixed effects
account for any variables that change over time that would take the same val-
ue for each judge on a panel within that year, such as national trends in case-
load, the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine, changing composition of the
Supreme Court, changes in Rule 23, and salient features of the partisan or po-
litical environment, such as an antilitigation posture in a party agenda. They
also account for trends over time in attitudes among men and white/other
judges toward copanelists who are women and African Americans, which
may affect the extent to which the latter are influenced by the former. The cir-
cuit and year fixed-effects approach leverages only variation in the relation-
ship between judges’ identity characteristics and their votes within circuit and
year. This approach allows us to estimate the effects of identity characteristics
78. We also find that Hispanic judges’ votes and the presence of a Hispanic judge on a
panel are not associated with higher probabilities of procertification votes and outcomes.
Among our cases with published opinions, we have an insufficient number of panels (twelve
cases) with a majority of Hispanic judges to evaluate their preferences when in the majority. As
we discuss below, it is not possible to evaluate with confidence whether minority-group judges
have distinctive preferences in some issue domains based only on their individual votes and
their votes when in a panel minority. There are an insufficient number of cases in the data with
Asian American and Native American judges to evaluate them separately.
79. By “as-if” random we mean that departures from true random assignment of cases are
inconsequential with respect to anything that would affect the outcomes studied. Levy and Chil-
ton report the results of an empirical study finding small differences in the frequency with
which circuits constituted panels with particular partisan configurations, such as panels with
one Republican, or panels with two Democrats, relative to a scenario in which all panels were
constituted purely by random draws from the circuit’s slate of eligible judges. They suggest that
such departures from randomness may arise from considerations of workload or judges’ sched-
uling needs. Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assign-
ment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2015). The validity of
inferences from our judge-characteristic variables do not depend on the assumption of random
assignment of judges to panels, but rather on the assumption of random assignment of cases to
panels once they are constituted. That is, we require the assumption that, for example, panels
with two women, or panels with three Democrats, are not more likely to be assigned cases with
stronger bases to grant certification. See Deborah Beim, Tom S. Clark & Benjamin E. Lauder-
dale, Random Assignment to Death 4 (Jan. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review). In Part I.C of the Appendix we discuss the relationship between random
assignment and interlocutory appeals under Rule 23(f).
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most effectively because it controls for the influence of any variables that
would take the same value for each judge in the same circuit and each judge in
the same year.
A. A Descriptive Look at the Data
We first present the data descriptively and then turn to statistical models.
We recognize that there may be interesting variation over time in certification
voting behavior and outcomes. However, our focus in this Article is on the
relationship between judge characteristics and certification votes and out-
comes. Other than subsetting the data at its approximate midpoint, we treat
the data cross-sectionally and do not examine longitudinal variation. In an-
other article growing out of the larger study, variation in certification over
time will be a central focus.



















Consumer 5% 23% 25%
Environmental ___ 3% 2%




Product Liability ___ 6% 5%
Public Benefits 8% ___ ___
Securities 11% 9% 8%
Other 11% 11% 9%
Table 1 shows the policy areas of the causes of action underlying the cer-
tification decisions in our data for all policy areas that exceed 2% of the data
for each subset displayed. We show descriptive statistics separately for dis-
crete periods and data sources that are used in the models discussed later.
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Table 2 provides the percentage of procertification votes by party, gender,
and race. The procertification voting rate in published cases was similar in
1967–1994 (43%) and 1995–2017 (41%), but the gap between groups grew in
the second period. The difference between Republican and Democratic voting
about doubled, increasing from 8 to 17 percentage points. African American
and white/other judges went from parity in the earlier period to African
Americans becoming more procertification by 14 percentage points in the lat-
ter. Women went from being less procertification by 6 percentage points in
the earlier period to more procertification by 11 percentage points in the later
one. When unpublished cases are added for the period 2002–2017, about one-
third of the cases are unpublished. The certification rates decline for all judge
types (denials are more prevalent in unpublished dispositions).80 In these cas-
es, the party and gender gaps remain comparable to published cases in 1995–
2017, whereas the race gap narrows. The dissent rate in the data is quite low,
at only 2%. Although it increased over time, it never reaches 3% in any seg-
ment of the data.








All Votes 43% 41% 37%
Republicans 39% 34% 30%
Democrats 47% 51% 44%
Men 44% 38% 34%
Women 38% 49% 43%
White/Other 43% 40% 36%
African Americans 43% 54% 43%
One simple way to characterize the data from a panel perspective is to ex-
amine the percentage of procertification outcomes (not votes) on panels that
have zero, one, two, and three panel members with the characteristic in ques-
tion. Table 3 displays this information. We lack sufficient data on panels with
three women, or with two or three African Americans, to meaningfully char-
acterize them. At the panel level, the relationships are more pronounced than
at the individual level. The swing from all-Republican to all-Democratic pan-
els was 17 percentage points in published cases in 1967–1994; it jumped to 35
80. In 2002–2017, there was a procertification outcome in 43% of published cases and
24% of unpublished cases.
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percentage points in published cases in 1995–2017; and it was 30 percentage
points in all cases in 2002–2017.








“___” indicates fewer than ten cases.
All Cases 43% 41% 36%
PARTY
All Republicans 32% 28% 28%
1 Dem, 2 Reps 41% 37% 28%
2 Dems, 1 Rep 48% 51% 45%
All Democrats 49% 63% 58%
GENDER
All Men 44% 34% 30%
1 Woman, 2 Men 38% 44% 37%
2 Women, 1 Man ___ 60% 51%
All Women ___ ___ ___
RACE







All African Americans ___ ___ ___
We observe small differences across gender and racial panel compositions
in published cases in 1967–1994 (the women and African Americans are
nearly always in the panel minority). In published cases in 1995–2017, more
clear differences emerge. The move from a panel with three men to one with a
single woman is associated with a 10 percentage-point increase in certifica-
tion, and the addition of a second woman is associated with another 16 per-
centage-point increase, for a total of 26 percentage points. These differences
decline modestly but remain large in all cases in 2002–2017, growing by 7
percentage points with the addition of one woman, and an additional 14 per-
centage points with the addition of a second, for a total increase of 21 per-
centage points. In published cases in 1995–2017, the addition of one African
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American relative to an all-white/other panel is associated with an increase of
12 percentage points in the rate of procertification outcomes, which declines
to a difference of 7 percentage points in all cases in 2002–2017.
In order to put the degree of ideological voting behavior in Court of Ap-
peals decisions on class certification in perspective, it is informative to view it
in light of the degree of such behavior in other areas. The largest empirical
study of Court of Appeals decision making is that of Sunstein et al.,81 which
evaluated voting patterns across the twenty-three policy areas that are listed
in Table 4.82 In selecting these twenty-three policy areas for study, Sunstein et
al. specifically endeavored to study the “most controversial issues of the
day,”83 not a random sample of the work of the Court of Appeals.
Using these data as a benchmark for Court of Appeals lawmaking in es-
pecially controversial areas, class certification is a little above the median in
terms of ideological voting and outcomes.84 The 14 percentage-point differ-
ence between individual-level Democratic and Republican votes in our class-
certification data is a little above the median for the policy areas listed in Ta-
ble 4 (excluding class actions), which is 10 percentage points. The 31 percent-
age-point difference in votes on all-Democratic versus all-Republican panels
in class-certification cases is a little above the median for the policy areas
listed in Table 4 (excluding class actions), which is 25 percentage points. We
suspect that many will be surprised that the outcome changes associated with
moving from unified Democratic to Republican panels in certification deci-
sions is larger than, for example, such changes in obscenity, capital punish-
ment, employment discrimination, desegregation, and abortion cases.85
81. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11.
82. See id. at 8. Table 4 reflects differences between individual votes of Democratic and
Republican appointees across all cases (D-R) and differences between Democratic and Republi-
can votes on all-Democratic panels versus all-Republican panels (DDD-RRR), which is an ap-
proximate measure of differences in case outcomes on such panels. This is because dissent rates
on unified panels are exceedingly low. In our certification data, over 98% of unified panels are
unanimous.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Comparing our data to the Sunstein et al. data is not straightforward because in dif-
ferent policy areas they collected data over different periods, and they were not consistent re-
garding whether unpublished cases were included. The most common starting decade in the
Sunstein data was the 1990s. Id. We conclude that the most reasonable basis for comparison is
the combination of our 1995–2017 published cases and our 2002–2017 unpublished cases.
85. We show below in statistical models that the actual difference between all-Democratic
and all-Republican panels is significantly larger when one conditions on necessary controls. We
limit our comparison to descriptive statistics because Sunstein et al. do not use statistical models
that would allow comparison.
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TABLE 4: SUNSTEIN ET AL. DATA ON DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PERCENT OF LIBERAL





Gay and Lesbian Rights 40 86
National Environmental Policy Act 24 51
NLRB 20 50
Affirmative Action 28 49
Sex Discrimination 17 46
Eleventh Amendment Abrogation 21 43
Piercing the Corporate Veil 13 39
Contract Clause 7 33
EPA 10 33
ADA 16 33
Class Certification 14 31
Campaign Finance 17 31
Obscenity 9 25
Federal Communications Commission 8 25
Capital Punishment 24 20




First Amendment 6 7
Criminal Appeals 4 2
Federalism 3 1
Takings 4 -2
Punitive Damages 0 -10
*The % of liberal votes in the policy area by Democratic appointees, minus the % by Republican appointees
**The % of liberal outcomes in the policy area by all-Democratic panels, minus the % by all-Republican Panels
B. Statistical Models
Of course, bivariate descriptive statistics can be misleading, especially
when they pool cases over a half century and across every circuit. A statistical
model is required to get a stronger handle on the data. In the empirical mod-
els of published cases that we discuss below, we first present a model pooled
over the full period 1967–2017 and then present models separately for the pe-
riods 1967–1994 and 1995–2017. Dividing the data roughly in half allows us
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to observe whether the significance or magnitudes of results changed materi-
ally over time. In addition, the breakpoint we select is substantively signifi-
cant. As documented in our prior work, beginning around the mid-1990s,
restricting opportunities and incentives for private civil actions in general—
and class actions in particular—became a more salient issue in the Republican
Party. Congressional Republicans introduced a growing number of anti-class
action bills; “important advocacy groups associated with the Republican Par-
ty, specifically including business groups and conservative law reform organi-
zations,” elevated their focus on curtailing class actions, and Supreme Court
justices became more polarized along ideological lines in their voting on Rule
23 issues.86
1. Individual-Level Model of Judge Votes
We begin with naive models (in that they ignore panel composition) that
include judge-level variables measuring party, gender, and race, as well as the
set of independent variables described in Part I.B of the Appendix. These logit
models, with certification votes as the dependent variable, are reported in Ta-
ble A-1 (Part I.D of the Appendix). Coefficients in logit models cannot be di-
rectly interpreted, and thus it is necessary to compute predicted changes in
probability of procertification outcomes associated with a change in levels or
categories of independent variables (such as the change from Republican to
Democratic).
In published cases over the full period (Model A), party is significant and
positive with a magnitude similar to the simple percentage differences in raw
voting rates. Party is associated with an increase of 11 percentage points in the
probability of a procertification vote. The separate models for 1967–1994
(Model B) and 1995–2017 (Model C) show that panel ideology grew from a 7
percentage-point difference in the first period to a 12 percentage-point differ-
ence in the second. In the 2002–2017 model of all cases (Model D), the differ-
ence was 10 percentage points. Gender and race are insignificant in the 1967–
2017 (Model A) and 1967–1994 (Model B) models of published cases. They
cross the .1 threshold in the 1995–2017 model of published cases (Model C)
and the 2002–2017 model of all cases (Model D). African American judges
were 8 and 6 percentage points more likely to vote in a procertification direc-
tion, respectively, and women were 4 percentage points more likely to do so
in both models.87
We considered the possibility of interaction effects among party, gender,
and race. This allows evaluation, for example, of whether Democratic women,
or African American women, are associated with a distinctive probability of
procertification voting that is not captured by the direct effects of party and
86. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 12, at 1524–28.
87. To anticipate our key finding with respect to gender, we note that when Models C
and D are restricted to cases in which there are zero or one woman, the gender variable becomes
clearly insignificant (p=.55 and .94, respectively). The fact that the gender variable crosses the .1
threshold in these models is driven by women’s votes when in the majority.
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gender, or race and gender, respectively. We take this up in Part III of the
Appendix and do not find evidence for such interaction effects.
2. Panel-Level Model of Outcomes
The data are much more interesting at the panel level. In our panel-level
outcome model, the unit of analysis is the case. In each case, we measure pan-
el effects with dichotomous variables (taking the value of 0 or 1) indicating
whether the panel contained zero, one, two, or three Democrats; zero, one,
two, or three women; and zero, one, two, or three African Americans. Panels
with three Republicans, panels with three men, and panels with three
white/other judges are the reference categories for the party, gender, and race
panel variables. This allows us to evaluate, for example, whether panels with
one, two, or three Democrats have a statistically distinguishable probability of
procertification outcomes from an all-Republican panel (the reference catego-
ry), and if so, by what margin. The logistic regression models of certification
outcomes reported in Table A-2 (in Part I.D of the Appendix) contain the full
set of these party, gender, and race panel variables, and all of the control vari-
ables enumerated in Part I.B of the Appendix.
Party. Model A shows that panels with one, two, and three Democrats are
all statistically significantly more likely to render procertification outcomes
than all-Republican panels in published cases over the full period. Table 5
displays predicted probabilities, derived from the model, of procertification
outcomes for each of the four partisan (ideological) panel combinations. All-
Republican panels have a 26% estimated probability of a procertification out-
come. The probability grows to 48% for RRD panels, to 55% for RDD panels,
to 61% for all-Democrat panels.
The separate models for published cases in 1967–1994 (Model B) and
1995–2017 (Model C) show that panel ideology is potent in both periods but
materially larger in the latter. In the 1967–1994 period, the move from an all-
Republican to an all-Democratic panel is associated with a 26 percentage-
point increase in the probability of a procertification outcome, from 31% to
57%. In the 1995–2017 period, it is associated with a 40 percentage-point in-
crease, from 24% to 64%. Further, while RRD panels are statistically distin-
guishable from RRR panels in the earlier period, in the latter period they are
clearly not. This means that one Democrat is not panel affecting, or dampen-
ing, two Republicans in 1995–2017. A supplemental regression shows that
one Republican did not panel affect two Democrats in published cases in ei-
ther 1967–1994 or 1995–2017.88 Thus, the difference in certification outcomes
on DDD panels and RRR panels grew in the contemporary period, and the
partisan panel dynamics became uniformly majoritarian, with partisan mi-
88. In order to arrive at this conclusion, we reran the same models (B and C), but this
time we held out as the reference category panels with three Democratic judges. The coefficient
for a DDR panel is clearly insignificant in both models, showing that one Republican does not
panel affect two Democrats.
November 2020] Politics, Identity, and Class Certification 261
norities in general failing to influence partisan majorities (no dampening) as
measured by outcome in precedential cases.
Model D includes both published and unpublished cases from the period
2002–2017, and we find that the addition of unpublished cases changes little.
Although the rate of procertification outcomes declines marginally for all
panel types—indicating that unpublished dispositions have a lower certifica-
tion rate on average—the results for party differences look very similar to
those in the 1995–2017 model of published cases. The gap between all-
Republican and all-Democratic panels is 38 percentage points (as compared
to 40 in published cases in 1995–2017). And it remains the case in this model
that partisan minorities do not panel affect partisan majorities.
Gender. Controlling for the partisan and racial composition of the panel,
and the variables listed in Part I.B of the Appendix, panels with one woman
do not have a statistically distinguishable probability of a procertification out-
come when compared to panels with three men in any model. Although we
have a large number of panels with one woman—276 panels, or 45% of the
cases in the 2002–2017 model of all cases—the coefficient on the variable is
small and it never approaches significance. In contrast, for panels with two
women it is highly significant, and the difference is large. In published cases
over the full period (Model A), moving from a panel with three men to one
with two women is associated with a 22 percentage-point increase in the
probability of a procertification outcome, growing from 37% to 59%.
The separate models for published cases in 1967–1994 (Model B) and
1995–2017 (Model C) show that the result for panels with two women is driv-
en entirely by the latter period. This is no surprise because there were only
two panels with two women in our data prior to 1995. When analysis is re-
stricted to the latter period, the difference between panels with two women
and those with three men is a little larger, associated with an increase of 25
percentage points, from 32% to 57% probability of a procertification outcome.
In our model of both published and unpublished cases decided in 2002–
2017 (Model D) we again find that the addition of unpublished cases changes
little. Panels with two women are associated with a 21 percentage-point
growth in the probability of a procertification outcome, which is comparable
to the 1995–2017 model of published cases. In our data for the 2002–2017 pe-
riod, there are 104 panels with two women. Sixty-five different women appear
on those panels, which are spread over ten circuits.
This raises the question whether women in the panel minority, when not
affecting the outcome votes of their male colleagues, are more likely to dis-
sent. Or are women in the panel minority joining the majority opinion never-
theless and suppressing their dissents? As compared to a man serving on a
panel with two other men, women are not more likely to dissent when serving
with two men, nor are men when serving with two women. The gender com-
position of the panel is not in any respect associated with dissenting behav-
ior.89
89. See Appendix, Section II.B.
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TABLE 5: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF PROCERTIFICATION OUTCOMES FOR





















“___” indicates that panel type is not statistically distinguishable from the reference category (in italics).
** indicates no cases in model.
PARTY
3 Reps 26% 31% 24% 20% 21% 17%
1 Dem,
2 Reps
48% 51% ___ ___ ___ ___
2 Dems,
1 Rep
55% 56% 52% 47% 47% 50%
3 Dems 61% 57% 64% 58% 58% 67%
GENDER
3 Men 37% 41% 32% 28% 28% 31%
1 Wom,
2 Men
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
2 Wom,
1 Man
59% ___ 57% 49% 50% 49%
3 Women ** ** ** ___ ___ ___
RACE
3 White/
Others 41% 43% 38% 34% 34% 35%
1 Af Am,
2WOs
50% ___ 54% 47% 48% 49%
2 Af Ams,
1WO
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
3 Af Ams ** ** ** ** ** **
Note: In models with three women or two African Americans designated as statistically indistinguishable from panels with
three men and those with three white/other judges, the maximum number of cases present is four and fourteen, respec-
tively, and thus we lack sufficient data to offer meaningful estimates.
We considered the possibility that men’s probability of a procertification
vote is unaffected by the presence of one woman because women are, on av-
erage, less senior. That is, it is possible that judges are more likely to defer to
more senior panel colleagues, and women are on average less senior, such that
the lack of women’s influence on outcomes when they are in a minority may
be a function of their relative lack of seniority rather than their gender. We
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evaluated whether increasing levels of seniority among women serving on
panels with two men is associated with certification outcomes and found the
relationship to be clearly statistically insignificant. Women’s lack of influence
on outcomes when they are in a minority is not associated with their level of
seniority.
We also considered the possibility that women from a particular political
party are associated with a distinctive probability of procertification voting
that is not captured by the direct effects of party and gender. We take this up
in Part III of the Appendix and find no evidence that the gender differences
we detect are distinctively driven by Democratic or Republican women.
Our interpretation of the higher rate of procertification voting by women
when they form a panel majority is that it more accurately reflects women’s
sincere preferences. When women are in the minority, outcomes on male-
majority panels are unaffected by these preferences, and from this we con-
clude that none of the “modified content” hypotheses is operative on such
panels as measured by outcome. Neither deliberation, nor bargaining, nor cue
taking is allowing women in the panel minority to affect certification out-
comes in the direction of the preferences revealed when they are in the major-
ity.90
This result stands in marked contrast to past work finding gender or race
panel effects on the Courts of Appeals.91 In each of these studies, where there
was clear evidence of gender- or race-based variation in preferences, the pres-
ence of one woman or African American in the panel minority was associated
with the voting of men and whites in the majority. All of these results oc-
curred in the disposition of substantive law claims concerning discrimination
and inequality.92 A different and more majoritarian gender dynamic is at
work in our class-certification decisions.
An important caveat is necessary regarding what can be inferred from the
data. The data show that one woman’s presence on a panel does not increase
90. As a theoretical matter we would not expect cue taking to be operative in certification
decisions, at least outside the context of “gender-coded issues.” Peresie, supra note 8, at 1783.
91. See Boyd et al., supra note 4; Cox & Miles, supra note 8; Farhang & Wawro, supra
note 8; Kastellec, supra note 8; Peresie, supra note 8. Indeed, inquiring whether a deliberation
account fully captured the panel effects she found, when Peresie “included a dummy variable in
the regressions for the presence of a second female judge, . . . that variable had no statistically
significant effect on male judges’ [votes].” Peresie, supra note 8, at 1782. Farhang and Wawro
similarly found that “having a majority of women on the panel does not increase the probability
that either male or female judges on the panel will vote for the plaintiff over the increase that
occurs when there is one woman serving on the panel.” Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 320;
see also id. at 321 (no effect on outcome).
92. Haire and Moyer, when analyzing a large sample of cases pooled across many policy
areas, find that the presence of two “nontraditional” judges (female or nonwhite) is associated
with greater variance, or unpredictability, in white male judges’ votes. HAIRE & MOYER, supra
note 3, at 96–97. Ultimately, it is not possible to derive any inference from Haire and Moyer’s
variance results regarding the ideological direction of white male judges’ votes (or nontradition-
al judge votes) in panels composed of one white male and two nontraditional judges, and thus
those results do not speak to the substance of our analysis.
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the probability of a procertification outcome relative to panels with three
men. Because we lack a sufficient number of panels with three women (there
are only four in the data), the data cannot rule out the possibility that one
man similarly fails to influence the probability of certification relative to pan-
els with three women. Because we lack the benchmark of how panels with
three women would decide certification issues, we cannot observe whether
one man on a panel affects two women relative to panels with three women.
Thus, we do not know whether the structure of gender panel dynamics is
symmetric or asymmetric.
Fifteen percent of the judge votes in the data are cast by women, and
there is at least one woman on 29% of the three-judge panels, but women are
in the majority in only 8% of the panels. Men are 87% of the votes and in the
majority 92% of the time. As distinguished from the earlier studies finding
gender panel effects, where women in the minority influenced outcomes, the
majoritarian character of gender panel dynamics in certification decisions
yields circuit lawmaking that significantly underrepresents women’s prefer-
ences (and overrepresents men’s preferences) relative to their numbers on the
Courts of Appeals.
Race. Controlling for the partisan and gender composition of the panel
and the variables listed in Part I.B of the Appendix, panels with one African
American have a statistically significantly higher probability of a procertifica-
tion outcome than all-white/other panels in published cases over the full peri-
od (Table A-2, Model A). All white/other panels have a predicted probability
of 41% to produce a procertification outcome, and for panels with one Afri-
can American the probability is 50% (Table 5), for a 9 percentage-point
growth. In contrast, panels with two African Americans are not statistically
distinguishable from all white/other panels. However, with only eleven such
panels in this model we do not regard this estimate as meaningful.
The separate models for published cases in 1967–1994 (Model B) and
1995–2017 (Model C) show that the result for one-African American panels is
primarily driven by the latter period. Of 166 one-African American panels,
seventy-two are in the former period, and ninety-four in the latter. In the first
period the variable is insignificant, and in the second period the coefficient
doubles and becomes significant. In the 1995–2017 model the presence of one
African American is associated with an increase of 16 percentage points, from
38% to 54% probability of a procertification outcome (Table 5).
In the model of both published and unpublished cases decided in 2002–
2017 (Model D) we again observe little change relative to the model of pub-
lished cases decided in 1995–2017. The presence of one African American
remains significant and is associated with a 13 percentage-point increase in
the probability of a procertification outcome, from 34% to 47%. In our data
for 2002–2017, there are 130 panels with one African American. Thirty-three
African Americans appear in those panels, which are spread over every cir-
cuit.
We considered the possibility that African Americans from a particular
political party are associated with a distinctive probability of procertification
outcomes that is not captured by the direct effects of party and race. We take
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this up in Part III of the Appendix and find no evidence that the race differ-
ences we detect are distinctively driven by Democratic or Republican African
Americans.93 Likewise, we considered whether judges with the intersectional
identity of African American women (or men) are associated with more (or
less) procertification voting than is captured by the separate direct effects of
the race and gender variables, and we again find no evidence that it is the
case, although the small number of African American women in the data lim-
it our ability to detect small differences.94
3. Panel-Level Model of Judge Votes (as distinguished from Case
Outcomes)
We also examined models of individual judge votes, where the key inde-
pendent variables capture both the salient characteristic of the voting judge
and those of her colleagues on the panel. This allows us to compare, for ex-
ample, the votes of a man sitting with two men with the votes of a man sitting
with one man and one woman. Part II of the Appendix explains in detail how
these variables were constructed. We then examined vote-level versions of the
case-level logit models we have just discussed, including the same control var-
iables. The models are presented and discussed in Part II of the Appendix.
Given the very high rate of unanimity in our cases (98%), it is not surprising
that the vote-level models tell the same panel effects story as the outcome-
level models with respect to party, gender, and race panel effects.
4. Discrimination and Other Civil Rights Claims Versus Other Underlying
Causes of Action
Another distinctive feature of our results concerns the existence of varia-
tion in judges’ preferences along gender and race lines in the area of class cer-
tification. As we have noted, past findings of variation in Court of Appeals
judges’ voting along gender and racial lines have clustered heavily in areas re-
lating to discrimination and inequality, and variation has often been absent
even in those areas.95 Boyd, Epstein, and Martin’s study of thirteen policy are-
as finds gender associated with differences in voting in only one (gender-
based employment discrimination), and they find no differences in a number
93. See Appendix, Part III. When we say that the association is not driven by African
Americans from a particular political party, we mean only that the two types of panels are not
statistically distinguishable from one another. In another sense, it is clearly Democratic African
Americans that are driving the result. Because Democratic presidents have appointed African
Americans at a dramatically higher rate, in 87% of our cases with one African American, the
African American was appointed by a Democrat. We were unable to examine specifications
comparing different partisan combinations on panels with two African Americans (as we do for
gender) because there are an insufficient number of such panels.
94. See Appendix, Part III.
95. See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 3; Boyd et al., supra note 4; Farhang & Wawro, supra
note 8; Peresie, supra note 8.
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of areas with comparable or higher gender salience (abortion, sexual harass-
ment, and affirmative action).96 Haire and Moyer find that, in a large sample
of civil cases spanning many policy areas that have a liberal/conservative di-
mension, African Americans do not vote more liberally than whites on the
Courts of Appeals. However, in employment discrimination cases based on
race, they have a higher probability of voting in the pro-plaintiff direction.97
We considered the possibility that the gender and race results we report
as to class certification are being driven by cases with underlying discrimina-
tion claims, and thus that they do not represent much of a departure from ex-
isting work on gender, race, and judging. That is, past work has shown that
women and African Americans on the Courts of Appeals are more likely to
favor plaintiffs making at least some types of discrimination claims,98 and
from there it is a short step to favoring discrimination plaintiffs seeking class
certification. When all types of discrimination claims are combined, they con-
stitute 10% of the data for our 2002–2017 models of published and un-
published cases, so that their influence on the results may be important. We
excluded those cases and reran the model.
The same gender and race panel variables remain significant and of com-
parable magnitude when we drop discrimination claims.99 The differences in
predicted probabilities between panels with three men and panels with two
women, and between panels with three white/other judges and panels with
one African American, are virtually identical.100 We then additionally exclud-
ed cases coded prisoners’ rights and other civil rights (which together consti-
tute another 11% of the data) so that there are no civil rights claims of any
kind remaining in the data. In this model, the differences in predicted proba-
bilities across the same panel types again remain significant and of similar
magnitude. Panels with two women are associated with an 18 percentage-
point increase in the probability of a procertification outcome, and panels
with one African American are associated with a 14 percentage-point in-
crease.101
We conclude with confidence that the results are not driven by discrimi-
nation claims or civil rights claims more broadly. When all civil rights claims
(discrimination or other) are excluded from the data for the 2002–2017 peri-
od, the policy areas constituting 2% or more of the underlying claims are, in
descending order of share: consumer, labor and employment (primarily wage
and hour and ERISA), securities, insurance, antitrust, product liability, and
environmental and toxic substances. Even outside the domain of antidiscrim-
ination law and civil rights law more broadly, panels with women in the ma-
96. See Boyd et al., supra note 4, at 400–06.
97. HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 3, at 30–32 (compare Model 1 and Model 4 in Table 1).
98. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 8, at 577 (gender); Kastellec, supra note 8, at 178
(race).
99. The results are presented in Model E infra in Table A-2.
100. See supra Table 5.
101. See supra Table 5; infra Table A-2, Model F.
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jority, and panels with one African American, are more procertification. This
result departs sharply from conventional wisdom and existing research.102
C. Explaining Procertification Preferences and Gender Panel Effects
1. Procertification Preferences
It is unclear why women and African Americans on the Courts of Ap-
peals have more procertification preferences. The explanation that connects
most readily to existing literature is that these preferences are tied to findings
showing that women and African Americans are more attentive to claims of
discrimination and inequality.103 The fact that our gender and race results are
robust when such claims are excluded does not foreclose the validity of this
line of reasoning. It is beyond question that the class action device has been
an enormously valuable tool in the struggle for gender and racial equality. In
light of the transsubstantive nature of Rule 23, interpretations of the rule in
the domains of consumer, securities, and wage and hour law, for example, can
shape future applications in domains such as employment, housing, and vot-
ing discrimination. Strategic judges concerned with developing the device for
use in the latter areas may be motivated to render more procertification deci-
sions in the former areas. If this is true, the transsubstantive character of the
rule causes procertification preferences in the domain of discrimination and
inequality to have procertification spillover effects in all other domains to
which the rule applies.
To be sure, this is speculative. The fact that the gender and race results
are robust when discrimination and other civil rights claims are excluded may
also mean that women and African Americans simply have more procertifica-
tion preferences in general. One variant of this account is only a short step
from the explanation in the last paragraph minus the strategic dimension. If
women and African Americans are more pro-plaintiff in cases raising some
types of claims based on discrimination and inequality, and they perceive that
the class action device has been an enormously valuable tool in the struggle
for gender, racial, and other forms of equality, then it may be that women and
African Americans have a more favorable view of the class device as a vehicle
to provide remedies and achieve regulatory goals more generally.
Whatever the reason, our gender results counsel caution in interpreting
past studies as having demonstrated that women on the Courts of Appeals do
not have different preferences than men with the exception of certain dis-
crimination claims. An important study cited for this conclusion was con-
ducted by Boyd, Epstein, and Martin,104 which finds that in twelve out of
102. It is likewise the case that when we exclude all discrimination and other civil rights
claims from the 1995–2017 model of published cases, the gender and race panel results are ro-
bust.
103. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
104. Boyd et al., supra note 4.
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thirteen policy areas, gender was not associated with votes. The single excep-
tion was gender-based employment discrimination claims.105 However, they
acknowledge that in each area they studied their sample sizes were too small
to evaluate panels with two women.106 The study thus was unable to evaluate
the possibility that a combination of majoritarian voting dynamics and pres-
sure toward suppressed dissent, or some other mechanism, could be such that
in some policy domains women’s different preferences will only become visi-
ble in panels where they constitute the majority. That is what we observe in
our class-certification data.
It is only because of our unusually large dataset relative to norms in the
field, and the heavy concentration of our cases in the last two decades—
during which time there was a substantially larger number of panels with two
women—that we had a sufficient number to detect that women’s preferences
are more procertification when in the majority. This limitation in existing
scholarship on the influence of gender on the Courts of Appeals is an im-
portant contextual consideration for interpreting every study that we are
aware of reporting null results for gender, none of which examines panels
with two women.107
2. Gender Panel Effects
Our data do not allow us to identify the panel dynamics that explain why
the presence of one woman on a panel is not associated with higher rates of
procertification outcomes but the presence of two women is. Nevertheless, we
recognize some possible explanations. One is straightforward. The single
woman on a panel, on average, advocates a more procertification view, but
this advocacy does not affect the outcome votes of the men in the majority
because they have intense preferences in the domain of class certification and
do not concede on outcomes. Sunstein et al., who studied partisan panel ef-
fects but not race and gender, argue that panel effects are less likely to occur
in policy domains, such as abortion and capital punishment, in which judges
have intense and “entrenched” preferences, undercutting the ability of parti-
san panel minorities to influence majorities.108
105. Id. at 390.
106. Id. at 392 n.8, 393 n.11.
107. See Cox & Miles, supra note 8, at 43–45 (reporting that gender is not associated with
Court of Appeals judges’ likelihood of voting in favor of liability in voting rights cases based on
individual-level results); Kastellec, supra note 8, at 178 (same with respect to voting in favor of
affirmative action programs on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Sisk et al., supra note 24, at 593
(same with respect to voting in favor of plaintiffs alleging religious discrimination on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals); Songer et al., supra note 26, at 433 (same with respect to search and seizure
and obscenity cases on the U.S. Courts of Appeals). None of these studies examined female-
majority panels. In some of these studies, the authors clearly lacked a sufficient sample size to do
so, and in some they were primarily interested in studying race, but all report gender to be in-
significantly associated with the outcome variables studied.
108. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 62–63, 69–70.
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As we have already noted, we lack sufficient data on panels with three
women to draw any inferences regarding whether one man is affecting the
votes of the two women who are his copanelists relative to the benchmark of
panels composed of only women. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that
judges in the gender majority—in general, whether men or women—do not
give ground on outcomes in this policy domain. This explanation for the ab-
sence of a one-woman panel effect would be analogous to what is probably
the most likely explanation for the absence of a one-Democrat or one-
Republican panel effect in the 1995–2017 period (which is when the two-
women panel effect is present). On this account, judges simply care intensely
about certification and have entrenched views, and thus majoritarian dynam-
ics prevail.
Our results for panels with one African American counsel caution in em-
bracing—and arguably militate against—this interpretation. At the same time
that one female judge is not panel affecting her two copanelists, one African
American judge is doing so strongly. We therefore know that Court of Ap-
peals judges’ votes on certification are, in fact, not impervious to significant
influence by one judge from another group. The puzzle is why this occurs
with respect to race but not gender.
Recent innovative work in political science has focused on the gender gap
in political discussions and decision making (and critical mass theory applied
to this context).109 This work leverages an insight drawn from the existing lit-
erature that numbers alone (descriptive representation) do not guarantee
women substantive representation. It uses institutional theory to identify
structural arrangements and norms that may affect the ability of women to
exercise “[a]uthoritative representation,” which is “any feature of communi-
cation among decision-makers that affects their authority,” or their “expecta-
tion of influence,” during the decision-making process.110 Scholars have tested
hypotheses drawn from this merger of gender and institutional theory by ana-
lyzing behavior in a variety of discussion and decision-making contexts, in-
109. See, e.g., Tali Mendelberg & Christopher F. Karpowitz, Power, Gender, and Group
Discussion, 37 ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 23, 23 (2016) [hereinafter Mendelberg & Karpowitz,
Group Discussion]; Tali Mendelberg, Christopher F. Karpowitz & J. Baxter Oliphant, Gender
Inequality in Deliberation: Unpacking the Black Box of Interaction, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 18, 18
(2014) [hereinafter Mendelberg et al., Black Box] (quoting Karen Beckwith & Kimberly Cowell-
Meyers, Sheer Numbers: Critical Representation Thresholds and Women’s Political Representa-
tion, 5 PERSPS. ON POL. 553, 553 (2007), who argue that “ ‘critical mass theory is both problemat-
ic and under-theorized,’ its mechanism ‘unspecified’ and the power of small numbers of women
‘neglected’ ”).
110. Christopher F. Karpowitz, Tali Mendelberg & Lauren Mattioli, Why Women’s Num-
bers Elevate Women’s Influence, and When They Do Not: Rules, Norms, and Authority in Politi-
cal Discussion, 3 POL. GRPS. & IDENTITIES 149, 150, 158 (2015) [hereinafter Karpowitz et al.,
Women’s Numbers]; Mendelberg et al., Black Box, supra note 109, at 20; see id. (“The more that
the features of the decision-making process signal and emphasize women’s status in the deci-
sion-making, that is, the more authoritative representation the process provides to women, the
more symbolic and substantive representation women will have as a consequence.”).
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volving both elite and nonelite participants, and they have done so in con-
trolled experiments and with data from lived experience.111
This institutional perspective enabled another key insight: achieving au-
thoritative and substantive representation sometimes requires institutional
help, such as a decision rule requiring unanimity rather than a simple majori-
ty. Research has shown that, at least in some settings, a decision rule requiring
a simple majority is inimical to the ability of women to exercise a fair share of
influence when they are in the minority, a disadvantage that continues in
some contexts until women constitute a majority (or even a super-
majority).112 Empirical research suggests two distinct (but obviously related)
mechanisms that may explain this pattern.
One concerns how amenable to persuasion a woman’s audience is. In
their award-winning research, Mendelberg and Karpowitz find that under
majority rule in an experimental context, when women are in the minority
they are treated as having less authority, are accorded less respect in the delib-
erative process, and are less likely to be perceived as making influential con-
tributions, as compared to when they are in the majority. The authors detect
no corresponding reductions for men on these dimensions when they move
from majority to minority.113 A reasonable reading of this research is that,
holding constant the substance of a woman’s contributions, she will be more
likely to persuade others and affect outcomes when in the majority.
An alternative or supplementary mechanism concerns how the delibera-
tive context affects the substance of women’s contributions. Mendelberg and
Karpowitz find—again, under majority rule in an experimental context—that
women in the minority are less likely to express their sincere preferences as
111. See CHRISTOPHER F. KARPOWITZ & TALI MENDELBERG, THE SILENT SEX: GENDER,
DELIBERATION, AND INSTITUTIONS (2014); Karpowitz et al., Women’s Numbers, supra note 110;
Tali Mendelberg, Christopher F. Karpowitz & Nicholas Goedert, Does Descriptive Representa-
tion Facilitate Women’s Distinctive Voice? How Gender Composition and Decision Rules Affect
Deliberation, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 291 (2014); Mendelberg & Karpowitz, Group Discussion, supra
note 109; Tali Mendelberg & Christopher F. Karpowitz, Women’s Authority in Political Deci-
sion-Making Groups, 27 LEADERSHIP Q. 487 (2016) [hereinafter Mendelberg & Karpowitz, Polit-
ical Decision-Making Groups]; Tali Mendelberg, Christopher F. Karpowitz & Lauren Mattiolo,
Gender and Women’s Influence in Public Settings, in EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1 (Robert Scott & Stephen Kosslyn eds., 2015) [hereinafter Mendelberg
et al., Women’s Influence]; Mendelberg et al., Black Box, supra note 109; Christopher F. Kar-
powitz, Tali Mendelberg & Lee Shaker, Gender Inequality in Deliberative Participation, 106 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 533 (2012); PAMELA BAN, JUSTIN GRIMMER, JACLYN KASLOVSKY & EMILY WEST,
A WOMAN’S VOICE IN THE HOUSE: GENDER COMPOSITION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN
COMMITTEE HEARINGS (2018) [hereinafter BAN ET AL., A Woman’s Voice], https://pdfs
.semanticscholar.org/9044/e3d065e6611ee987ce21a9bf3fd6e5a3e085.pdf [https://perma.cc
/765M-5KSV].
112. See Mendelberg et al., Women’s Influence, supra note 111, at 4–5, 7.
113. See Mendelberg et al., Black Box, supra note 109, at 25–29. The authors’ measures of
treating a person with authority and respect during a deliberative decision-making process were
based on the frequency of interruptions and the negative or positive valence of the language
used by those interrupting. Perceived influence was measured based on questioning participants
after the group decision process ended. Id. at 22–23.
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compared to when they are in the majority.114 The authors see this outcome as
tied to women being treated as less authoritative, less deserving of respect,
and less influential when in the minority.115
The relationship of these theories to our research is speculative and, given
the cloistered context of appellate judicial decision making, they are not easily
tested by quantitative or qualitative research. We are mindful of the hazards
of transposing to decision making on the Courts of Appeals a theory previ-
ously tested in quite different contexts.116 That said, the potential explanatory
power of this theory should not be rejected based on the notion that gender
bias, even unconscious gender bias, is not plausibly operative in Court of Ap-
peals decision making. We suspect that few men would have thought that
women experience gender bias when arguing cases in the Supreme Court.
Yet, recent research shows that they do.117 More to the point, recent research
also shows that women on the Supreme Court themselves experience gen-
dered behavior during oral argument, where they are interrupted at higher
rates than men.118 Still more recent research, confined to interruptions by jus-
114. See Karpowitz et al., Women’s Numbers, supra note 110, at 168; Mendelberg & Kar-
powitz, Political Decision-Making Groups, supra note 111, at 497 (“In other words, when em-
powered by the group context, women not only spoke more, they also spoke differently. . . . We
found that when women were outnumbered by men under majority rule, they were dramatically
more likely to advocate for principles other than the one they privately preferred.”).
115. See Mendelberg & Karpowitz, Political Decision-Making Groups, supra note 111, at
498–99.
116. See BAN ET AL., A Woman’s Voice, supra note 111, at 5 (“[W]e are cautious when ap-
plying theory and findings with respect to non-elites to [a study of discussion dynamics in con-
gressional hearings].”); id. at 7–8 (noting adjustments necessary given focus on discussion, not
deliberation); Karpowitz et al., Women’s Numbers, supra note 110, at 161 (“Thus, the effect of
numbers on women’s authority—and more broadly, the political psychology of gendered partic-
ipation—cannot be understood apart from careful attention to the interaction of the social iden-
tity of the members and the rules under which the group comes together.”). Note, however, that
Karpowitz and Mendelberg replicated a number of their key findings in an experimental setting
by analyzing officials’ speech during school board meetings. See KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG,
supra note 111, at 273–304 (“Gender Inequality in School Boards”).
117. See Dana Patton & Joseph L. Smith, Lawyer, Interrupted: Gender Bias in Oral Argu-
ments at the US Supreme Court, 5 J.L. & CTS. 337, 338 (2017) (finding that women are interrupt-
ed earlier, allowed to speak for less time between interruptions, and subjected to more and
longer interventions by justices compared to men). The authors also find that, unlike men argu-
ing before the Court, women do not enjoy the benefit of being treated more deferentially (more
time to first interruption, and less frequent interruption) when they represent the winning side.
Id. at 352. However, they find that this pattern disappears (becomes statistically insignificant) in
oral arguments in cases involving gender-related issues. Id.
118. See Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideolo-
gy, and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1482 (2017) (“Our
findings clearly establish that women on the Supreme Court are interrupted at a markedly high-
er rate during oral arguments than men. Additionally, both male Justices and male advocates
interrupt women more frequently than they interrupt other men.”). This phenomenon appears
to have survived the recent move to telephone arguments. Based on an analysis of the arguments
in ten cases in May 2020, Professor Litman found that interruptions by the Chief Justice, who
controlled the time available to each justice, “were markedly gendered and ideological. The
Chief Justice only interrupted liberal Justices, and nine of the 11 interruptions were of women
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tices, finds that “female justices speak significantly less when interrupted by
male justices.”119
This work on gender may shed light on why patterns of gender panel ef-
fects in our class action data differ from those found in employment discrim-
ination cases. In the latter area, researchers concluded that the presence of
one woman did significantly influence men in the majority, an effect that they
thought may be explained by the men taking “cues” from women who they
perceived (based on gender) as more expert or informed.120 If this account of
the mechanism is correct, in employment discrimination cases in the Courts
of Appeals women may be perceived by men as more, rather than less, author-
itative.121 Why does this panel effect disappear when we shift to class-
certification decisions?
In the domain of class certification, in contrast with employment dis-
crimination, there is no reason to anticipate that men on a panel will take cues
from women based on their gender. In that domain a woman is no longer
empowered to sway the men’s votes by her gender and the perspectives and
experience it is presumed to entail. If the dynamics identified by Mendelberg,
Karpowitz and their colleagues are at play, it could suggest several possibili-
ties. One is that a woman in the minority who advocates for a preferred out-
come is less successful because, as a panel minority in a domain that does not
elicit gender-based deference, she is regarded as less authoritative and influ-
ential.122 Another is that the reinforcement of another woman increases her
Justices.” Leah M. Litman, Muted Justice, SSRN 27 (May 19, 2020)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3605444 [https://perma.cc/58ME-AUBN].
119. Adam Feldman & Rebecca D. Gill, Power Dynamics in Supreme Court Oral Argu-
ments: The Relationship Between Gender and Justice-to-Justice Interruptions, 40 JUST. SYS. J. 173,
188 (2019).
120. See Boyd et al., supra note 4, at 392; Peresie, supra note 8, at 1783–84. This also seems
consistent with the finding of Patton and Smith that although women do not enjoy the benefit of
being treated more deferentially in oral arguments when they represent the winning side (as
men are), this pattern disappears in cases involving gender-related issues. Patton & Smith, supra
note 117, at 352.
121. In a brief discussion of judicial decision making as “[o]ne civic setting where the ef-
fect of group composition can be seen clearly,” two scholars who have been at the forefront of
recent gender-gap research summarize a few panel effects studies finding that “when judicial
panels include at least one woman, the panel is more likely to take a pro-plaintiff position.”
Mendelberg & Karpowitz, Political Decision-Making Groups, supra note 111, at 493. They con-
clude that “at least with respect to some issues, small individual-level differences between men
and women may be amplified by the gender context of the group, and women’s presence in
group decision-making bodies can affect the group’s outcome.” Id. See also KARPOWITZ &
MENDELBERG, supra note 111, at 339–40; Mendelberg et al., Women’s Influence, supra note 111,
at 10 (“[M]ore remains to be done to understand the mechanisms of these gender composition
effects or the processes by which judges interact.”).
122. Interpreting an interview with Justice Ginsburg, Adam Liptak observed: “But Justice
Ginsburg said her own influence in all sorts of cases at the justices’ conferences was uncertain. ‘I
will say something and I don’t think I’m a confused speaker and it isn’t until somebody else says
it that everyone will focus on the point,’ Justice Ginsburg said.” Adam Liptak, The Waves Minor-
ity Judges Always Make, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05
/31/weekinreview/31liptak.html [https://perma.cc/AT4E-4JVV].
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propensity to advocate preferences that differ systematically from those of her
male colleagues in areas without obvious gender salience, such as class certifi-
cation.123 We are aware of no research that explores the issues we have been
discussing as applied to race rather than gender.
CONCLUSION
In this Article we have undertaken the first empirical analysis (as far as
we are aware) of how potentially salient characteristics of Court of Appeals
judges and panels influence class-certification decisions under Rule 23. We
find that the party of the appointing president has a very strong association
with Court of Appeals judges’ votes on certification, with all-Democratic pan-
els having dramatically higher rates of certification than all-Republican pan-
els—nearly triple in about the past twenty years. Our findings on race and
gender panel effects show that these identity characteristics of judges also
matter significantly to certification. We are aware of no prior study that re-
ports both gender and race panel effects in the same body of cases. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, our results show that diversity on the bench is con-
sequential to lawmaking beyond policy areas conventionally thought to be of
particular concern to women and members of racial minorities, which consti-
tute a relatively narrow band of substantive law.
In seeking an explanation for the procertification preferences of women
and African Americans on the Courts of Appeals, we note that class action
doctrine is a form of transsubstantive procedural law that traverses many pol-
icy areas. Whether or not as a result of strategic judicial behavior, the effects
of gender and racial diversity on the bench through certification radiate wide-
ly across the legal landscape, influencing implementation in such areas as
consumer, securities, labor and employment, antitrust, insurance, product li-
ability, and environmental law, among many other areas. The results high-
light how the consequences of diversity extend beyond conceptions of
“women’s issues” or “minority issues.” The results also suggest the im-
portance of exploring the effects of diversity on transsubstantive procedural
law more generally.
Our findings on gender panel effects in particular are novel in the litera-
ture on panel effects and the literature on gender and judging. Past work fo-
cusing on substantive antidiscrimination law found that one woman can
influence the votes of men in the majority (mirroring what we find with re-
spect to African Americans in class-certification decisions). These results al-
123. Women may be “respond[ing] to situations that signal to them that they have power
by accelerating their participation and to situations that signal their powerlessness by decreasing
their participation.” Mendelberg & Karpowitz, Group Discussion, supra note 109, at 26. Cf.
Mendelberg et al., Black Box, supra note 109, at 24 (“Gender composition shifts the tone of
men’s direct engagement with women from clearly negative to highly positive. But it does so
only under majority rule.”); id. at 27 (“Similarly, we now understand why majority rule is bad
for minority women—they seldom hear encouragement when they speak.”). This perspective
does not suggest that women are more influenced by signals about their power than men, but
rather that they receive different signals.
274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:231
lowed for optimism that the panel structure—which threatens to dilute the
influence of minority groups on the bench—actually facilitates minority in-
fluence, whether through deliberation, cue taking, bargaining, or some other
mechanism. Although the mechanism remained a mystery, it was clear that
panels were not operating in a simple majoritarian fashion that trounced mi-
nority views.
Our gender results are quite different and normatively troubling. We ob-
serve that women have more procertification preferences based on their votes
when in the majority. However, women are not more likely to vote in a pro-
certification direction when they are the panel minority; men sitting with
women are not more likely to do so when they are in the majority; and such
cases are not more likely to yield procertification outcomes. Only when wom-
en are in the majority do we observe notably elevated procertification votes by
both women in the majority and men in the minority, yielding a higher rate
of procertification outcomes. Panels with a majority of women occur at
sharply lower rates than women’s percentage of judgeships.
In seeking to identify a mechanism that may explain these results, we
consider a number of admittedly speculative possibilities. One is that men on
the Courts of Appeals have intense and entrenched views on certification,
making their votes exceptionally difficult to influence. Several others are illu-
minated by recent scholarship on the gender gap and critical mass theory.
One is that in the domain of class certification, unlike that of employment
discrimination, a woman is not empowered to sway the votes of men by her
gender and the perspectives and experience it is presumed to entail. A woman
in the minority who advocates for a preferred outcome is less successful be-
cause, as a panel minority in such a domain, she is regarded as less authorita-
tive and influential. Another is that the reinforcement of another woman
increases her propensity to advocate preferences that differ systematically
from those of men in areas without obvious gender salience, such as class cer-
tification.
Finally, the majoritarian structure of the gender panel results counsels
caution in the interpretation of prior work purporting to find that gender is
consequential to Court of Appeals decision making only in rare circumstanc-
es. That work has been based largely on sample sizes too small to evaluate
panels with a majority of women, or it simply did not evaluate them. Null re-
sults that do not isolate votes and outcomes when women are in a panel ma-
jority cannot foreclose the existence of large differences in preferences along
gender lines, and they may reflect suppression of women’s influence.
Although we find that the presence of one African American is associated
with elevated rates of procertification votes and outcomes, we nevertheless
believe that our gender results also counsel caution as to interpretation of null
results associated with any minority judge characteristic (including race) in
models that do not isolate votes and outcomes when the group is in the ma-
jority. Scholars understand little about mechanisms that underpin panel ef-
fects, and about when and why gender and race are associated with variation
in judges’ preferences across different substantive domains. It would be fool-
ish to assume that the panel dynamics we observe with respect to gender in
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class-certification decisions will never be present with respect to race in an-
other field of law.
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APPENDIX
PART I.A
We began by identifying every decision classified by the Westlaw head-
note system as addressing any class action issue (there are thirty-three such
headnotes) from 1966 to 2017. This yielded over 2,000 cases. Each case was
read by a coder to determine if the court addressed whether to certify a class
under Rule 23, and if so, the case was included in our data if published. We
identified 1,139 such cases decided by three-judge panels, the first of which
was decided in 1967.
With respect to unpublished cases, our goal was to identify years in which
all (or substantially all) unpublished cases were available so as to create a da-
taset that was not vulnerable to selection bias as a result of studying only pub-
lished decisions or some but not all (or substantially all) unpublished
decisions. By 2002, with the exception of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the
full text of “nearly every federal appellate unpublished opinion” was provided
to Westlaw and included in the Federal Appendix, and West published these
opinions in the same manner as ordinary published opinions in that “West’s
attorneys assigned headnotes, topics, and key numbers to the cases.”124 The
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ unpublished opinions became consistently avail-
able in 2003 and 2005, respectively.125 However, we observed that some un-
published summary dispositions of appeals of certification decisions lack
sufficient legal discussion to receive headnote classifications. We used word
searches to identify these cases and added them to the data. For the circuit
years in which all (or substantially all) unpublished cases are available—2003–
2017 for the Fifth Circuit, 2005–2017 for the Eleventh Circuit, and 2002–2017
for the rest—we identified 205 unpublished cases decided by three-judge pan-
els in which the court ruled on whether a class should be certified under Rule
23.126
This produced a total of 1,344 published and unpublished cases decided
by three-judge panels. From here we lost 67 cases due to missing values on
some variable in the model. This was because the outcome variable on the
Court of Appeals could not be characterized as a plaintiff or defendant win
(37 cases); likewise for the direction of the district court decision (19 cases);
there were missing votes because an originally assigned judge became una-
124. Solomon, supra note 72, at 205–07.
125. Id.
126. Recent research on immigration appeals casts doubt on the completeness of un-
published opinions in that domain. See Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill & Fatma Marouf, Invisible
Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J. 683 (2018). The authors acknowledge,
however, that this may not be a general phenomenon, noting, among other things, the sheer
volume of immigration appeals and the fact that they involve review of administrative determi-
nations (without earlier consideration by an Article III court). Id. at 699–700. We are unable to
evaluate the implications of this research for class-certification decisions. We have no reason to
believe that gaps, if any, are correlated with panel composition.
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vailable before the case was decided (such as by death) and it was disposed of
by the remaining two (10 cases); and 1 case had a missing value on the law-
type variables.
PART I.B
In all of the statistical models reported below, the following control varia-
bles are included:
• TRIAL COURT OUTCOME: Indicator variable reflecting whether the
trial court certified the class (or portion of the class) that is under
consideration by the Court of Appeals.
• TRIAL JUDGE SITTING BY DESIGNATION: Indicator variable record-
ing whether a judge was a trial judge sitting by designation in the
individual-level model (Table A-1), or whether there was a trial
judge sitting by designation on the panel in the panel-level vote
and outcome models (Tables A-2 and A-3).127
• DEFENDANT TYPE: Non-mutually exclusive indicator variables
measuring whether certification was sought with respect to a
federal defendant, state defendant, business defendant, or other
type of defendant.
• LAW TYPE: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring
whether certification was sought for claims arising under federal
law, state law, or both.
• CLASS TYPE: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring
whether certification was sought for a plaintiff class, a defendant
class, or both.
• POLICY AREA: Mutually exclusive indicator variables reflecting
policy area. Our policy classifications are: civil rights-
discrimination, civil rights-prisoner, civil rights-other, labor and
employment, consumer, product liability, environmental and
toxic substances, antitrust, securities, insurance, and public
benefits. Remaining policy areas each comprised less than 2% of
the data, and we aggregated them into an “other” policy category.
• CERTIFICATION VERSUS DECERTIFICATION: Indicator variable re-
cording whether the court was deciding a motion to certify or a
motion to decertify.
• INTERLOCUTORY: Indicator variable measuring whether the ap-
peal of the certification decision was interlocutory.
127. We say “trial judge” rather than district judge because judges from the Court of
Claims and the International Court of Trade also sit by designation. In alternative specifications,
we also examined models with a control for any judge not from the circuit that decided the case,
including both trial judges and visiting appellate judges, and this difference had no material ef-
fect on the results we report (not displayed).
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• CIRCUIT FIXED EFFECTS: Circuit fixed effects (dummy variables
for each circuit) account for any time-varying covariates that
take the same value for each judge on a panel within the circuit.
• YEAR FIXED EFFECTS: Year fixed effects (dummy variables for each
year) account for any time-varying covariates that take the same
value for each judge on a panel within the year.
PART I.C
Rule 23(f), adopted in 1998, created a vehicle to petition for interlocutory
review of a certification decision.128 We understand that in at least some cir-
cuits a randomly constituted (or “as-if” randomly constituted) motions panel
that is assigned a Rule 23(f) petition has discretion to elect to, or request per-
mission to, proceed to the merits of the certification issue on grounds of judi-
cial economy rather than having the merits of the certification decision
randomly assigned to a merits panel.129 Commentators have observed this
about the Seventh Circuit,130 and we do not know the extent to which it oc-
curs elsewhere. Though Professor Sachs finds that this practice “appear[s] to
be confined almost exclusively to the Seventh Circuit,” she does observe a
very small number of instances in which it occurred outside the Seventh Cir-
cuit.131 The operation of this practice would not change our finding that pan-
els with Democratic majorities, two women, and one African American are
more likely to rule in a procertification direction. It would change only the
proper description of the causal process generating the result.
If the appeal of the merits of the certification issue is randomly assigned
in all cases (no retention after a Rule 23(f) grant), a statistically significant dif-
ference between types of panels in their probability of a procertification out-
come allows us to conclude that the two types of panels, on average, decide
differently in the equivalent body of certification issues. In contrast, if the ini-
tial random assignment of a Rule 23(f) petition allows the panel to either deny
the appeal or grant it and, in some cases, proceed to the merits of the certifica-
tion issue, a statistically significant difference between two panel types in
probability of procertification outcome allows the inference that they have a
different probability of rendering such outcomes in an equivalent body of ini-
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. In the 2002–2017
period, our data on published and unpublished cases contained one other vehicle for interlocu-
tory review—28 U.S.C. § 1292. Two percent of cases in that data identified § 1292 as the sole
basis for interlocutory review, and another 5% cited both 28 U.S.C. § 1292 and Rule 23(f). In our
empirical models we defined the interlocutory variable as any interlocutory appeal.
129. See, e.g., Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2013).
130. Margaret V. Sachs, Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: The Untold Story of Fraud-on-
the-Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1233–34 (2015); see also James C. Schroeder, The Sev-
enth Circuit’s Unique Approach to Handling Rule 23(f) Petitions, CLASS DEF. BLOG (Oct. 15,
2013), https://www.classdefenseblog.com/2013/10/the-seventh-circuits-unique-approach-to-
handling-rule-23f-petitions/ [https://perma.cc/5555-3Y3C].
131. Sachs, supra note 130, at 1234.
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tial assignments. That body of assignments is a combination of post-final
judgment appeals and 23(f) petitions, which are opportunities to reach the
merits. In the scenario in which all certification-merits questions are random-
ly assigned (no retention of cases after a 23(f) grant), the effect captured by
the difference in probability would arise only from the panel-identity charac-
teristics. In the scenario in which certification-merits questions include ones
that panels retained after granting a 23(f) petition—if 23(f) is used to channel
different types of cases to different types of panels—the causal process would
be a combination of panel characteristics and use of opportunities given by
Rule 23(f). In both scenarios, random assignment to different panel types is
associated with variation in the probability of certification. Because we in-
clude circuit and year fixed effects, we only compare outcomes issued by pan-
els governed by the same assignment practices.
In fact, we find no evidence that selection of cases under Rule 23(f) is oc-
curring in the data. Some of the reasons commonly understood to have moti-
vated the rule’s adoption suggest the possibility of a specific selection story.
The rule was intended, in part, to address the perception that if the district
court certified, defendants often faced heavy pressure to settle, and if the dis-
trict court denied certification, plaintiffs often lacked sufficient incentive to
proceed, and these dynamics substantially insulated the district court’s certifi-
cation decision from appellate review after a final judgment.132 In light of
these reasons, if panels that decide a Rule 23(f) petition can retain the case for
disposition of the certification issue, the following selection process could be
at play. More procertification panels, on average, would be more likely to
grant 23(f) petitions and reverse when the district court denied certification,
knowing that cases in which it granted certification would likely settle. More
anticertification panels, on average, would be more likely to grant 23(f) peti-
tions and reverse when the district court granted certification, knowing that
cases in which it denied certification would likely settle.
Put simply, and quite plausibly we think, if panels are allowed to grant
23(f) petitions and retain the appeal, they may be more likely to review and
reverse decisions that are, on average, contrary to their presumed preferences.
This does not happen in our data. We regressed the variable measuring
whether an appeal was interlocutory on each panel type with more than twen-
ty cases in the data (i.e., two Democrats, two women, one African American),
with year and circuit fixed effects. No such panel types were statistically sig-
nificantly associated with interlocutory appeals. We also regressed the inter-
locutory appeal variable on all panel types simultaneously, with year and
circuit fixed effects, and found them to be jointly insignificant with an F-test.
These individual and joint tests on the association between panel types and
interlocutory appeals were performed on (1) all published and unpublished
cases in 2002–2017, (2) such cases but only if the district court certified, and
(3) such cases but only if the district court denied certification. Finally, be-
cause we are aware that the Seventh Circuit gives panels that grant 23(f) peti-
132. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment.
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tions discretion to keep the cases, we reran the models of all published and
unpublished cases dropping the Seventh Circuit. The results for panels with
two or three Democrats, two women, and one African American were robust
in terms of significance and magnitude (the marginal effect was equal or
slightly larger for all these panel types).
PART I.D





































All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy ar-
ea, direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal govern-
ment, state government, business, other), law type (federal law, state law, both), type of class for which
certification was sought (plaintiff, defendant, both), whether the motion was for certification or decertifica-
tion, and whether the appeal was interlocutory. Model D additionally contains a variable indicating whether
the case was published.
N= 3,296 1,732 1,547 1,772
Pseudo R2= .15 .23 .15 .20
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on case.
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3 Af Ams ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy area, direction of
the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal government, state government, busi-
ness, other), law type (federal law, state law, both), type of class for which certification was sought (plaintiff, defendant,
both), whether the motion was for certification or decertification, and whether the appeal was interlocutory. Models D, E,
and F additionally contain a variable indicating whether the case was published.
N= 1085 567 511 586 528 462
Pseudo R2= .17 .25 .18 .23 .23 .23
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on case.
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Rep voting with 2Rs (All Republican Panels) (reference)





































Man voting with 2 Ms (All Male Panels) (reference)



































White/Other voting with 2 WOs (All White/ Other Panels) (reference)





























Af Am voting with 2AAs (All Af
Am Panels) ___ ___ ___
All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy
area, direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal
government, state government, business, other), law type (federal law, state law, both), type of class
for which certification was sought (plaintiff, defendant, both), whether the motion was for certification
or decertification, and whether the appeal was interlocutory. Models B and C additionally contain a
variable indicating whether the case was published.












N= 1,535 1,758 1,386
Pseudo R2= .17 .23 .23
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on case.
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TABLE A-4: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF PROCERTIFICATION VOTES FOR











“___” indicates that panel type is not statistically distinguishable from the reference category
(in italics).
** indicates no cases in model.
PARTY
Rep voting with 2Rs (All Re-
publican Panels) 23% 20% 17%
Rep voting with 1R & 1D ___ ___ ___
Dem voting with 2Rs 50% ___ ___
Rep voting with 2Ds 50% 48% 53%
Dem voting with 1D & 1R 55% 50% 53%
Dem voting with 2Ds (All
Democratic Panels) 64% 58% 67%
GENDER
Man voting with 2Ms (All Male
Panels) 31% 27% 30%
Man voting with 1M & 1W ___ ___ ___
Wom voting with 2Ms ___ ___ ___
Man voting with 2Ws 60% 53% 52%
Wom voting with 1W & 1M 57% 50% 50%
Wom voting with 2Ws (All
Woman Panels) ** ___ ___
RACE
White/Other voting with 2
WOs (All White/Other Panels) 38% 34% 36%
White/Other voting with 1WO
& 1AA 53% 47% 50%
Af Am voting with 2 WOs 54% 48% 51%
White/Other voting with 2AAs ___ ___ ___
Af Am voting with 1AA & 1WO ___ ___ ___
Af Am voting with 2AAs (All Af
Am Panels) ** ** **
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PART II
An individual vote-level model of panel effects requires that we disaggre-
gate the party, gender, and race variables. Our approach is to create variables
that capture the identity of the voting judge and the characteristics of her col-
leagues on the panel. This requires that each variable measuring a characteris-
tic (party, gender, race) be disaggregated into six variables. Table A-5 defines
each of the six variables associated with party, gender, and race panel effects.
Although the table is labored, the information is necessary in order to under-
stand the textured information conveyed by the regression models. For each
set of indicator variables, we designate the reference category with the “refer-
ence” parenthetical.
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TABLE A-5: PANEL VARIABLES FOR PARTY, GENDER, AND RACE
Variable Description Variable Name
Republican Majority Panels
Republican voting with 2 other
Republicans (reference) Rep voting with 2Rs
Republican voting with
1 Republican & 1 Democrat Rep voting with 1R & 1D
Democrat voting with 2 Republicans Dem voting with 2Rs
Democratic Majority Panels
Republican voting with 2 Democrats Rep voting with 2Ds
Democrat voting with
1 Democrat & 1 Republican
Dem voting with 1D & 1R
Democrat voting with 2 other Democrats Dem voting with 2Ds
Male Majority Panels
Man voting with 2 other Men (reference) Man voting with 2Ms
Man voting with 1 Man & 1 Woman Man voting with 1M & 1W
Woman voting with 2 Men Wom voting with 2Ms
Female Majority Panels
Man voting with 2 Women Man voting with 2Ws
Woman voting with 1 Woman & 1 Man Wom voting with 1W & 1M
Woman voting with 2 other Women Wom voting with 2Ws
White/Other Majority Panels
White/Other voting with 2 other White/Others (refer-
ence) White/Other voting with 2WOs
White/Other voting with 1 White/Other
& 1 African American White/Other voting with 1WO & 1AA
African American voting with 2 White/Others Af Am voting with 2WOs
African American Majority Panels
White/Other voting with 2 African Americans White/Other voting with 2AAs
African American voting with 1 African American & 1
White/Other Af Am voting with 1AA & 1WO
African American voting with 2 other African Americans Af Am voting with 2AAs
PART II.A: PARTY
We replicated all of the models in Table A-2, but with the individual-level
panel variables substituted for the case-level variables, and the results we ob-
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serve are entirely consistent with the outcome models in terms of both signifi-
cance and magnitude. We focus here on models that we regard as most signif-
icant. Table A-3 presents vote-level models of published cases in 1995–2017
(Model A), all published and unpublished cases in 2002–2017 (Model B), and
published and unpublished cases in 2002–2017 after excluding all discrimina-
tion and other civil rights claims (Model C). Using these model results, we
computed predicted probabilities of procertification votes for each of the
judge-party panel combinations that were statistically distinguishable from
votes on all-Republican panels, and they are displayed in Table A-4 (Part I.D
of this Appendix). Not surprisingly in light of 98% unanimity in the cases,
they look very similar to case outcome probabilities. The switch from a Re-
publican voting on an all-Republican panel to a Democrat voting on an all-
Democratic panel is dramatic. The probability of a procertification vote grows
by 41 percentage points in the 1995–2017 model of published cases, 38 in the
2002–2017 model of published and unpublished cases, and a striking 50 in the
same model but after excluding discrimination and other civil rights claims.
Mixed panels have levels of procertification voting between these two poles.
Also consistent with the outcome models in 1995–2017 (published) and
2002–2017 (published and unpublished), in all three vote-level models the
panels are symmetrically majoritarian. The insignificance of REP VOTING WITH
1R & 1D shows that a single Democrat fails to discernably affect the votes of
Republicans in the panel majority relative to how they vote on all-Republican
panels. In alternative specifications leaving out all-Democratic panels as the
reference, we likewise observe that a single Republican fails to affect the votes
of Democrats in the panel majority relative to how they vote on all-
Democratic panels (not displayed).
PART II.B: GENDER
For the gender panel variables, a man voting on a panel with two other
men is the reference category. Controlling for partisan and racial panel com-
position, and the variables listed in Part I.B of the Appendix, the variable cap-
turing the votes of men serving on a panel with one woman (MAN VOTING
WITH 1M & 1W) is insignificant in all three models, indicating that they are
no more likely to vote in a procertification direction than when serving on a
panel with two other men. Likewise, the variable capturing a woman sitting
with two men (WOM VOTING WITH 2MS) is insignificant in all three models,
indicating that they are no more likely to vote in a procertification direction
than a man serving on a panel with two other men. These two variables cap-
ture the same panels (with two men and one woman) and separately measure
votes of men and women as panel members, showing that neither is statisti-
cally distinguishable from the votes of men on panels with three men.
In sharp contrast, when there are two women on a panel, the variable
measuring the vote of the man serving with them (MAN VOTING WITH 2WS) is
statistically significant, positive, and large in magnitude, indicating that men
on such panels are materially more likely to vote in a procertification direc-
tion as compared to when serving with two other men. Likewise, the variable
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measuring the vote of a woman serving on a panel with one other woman
(WOM WITH 1W & 1M) is statistically significantly larger than the votes of
men on panels with three men. These two variables capture the same panels
(with two women and one man) and separately measure the votes of men and
women as panel members, showing that both are materially more likely to
cast procertification votes than a man on a panel with two other men. On
these panels, men and women vote in a procertification direction at approxi-
mately the same rate, which is consistent with the high level of unanimity in
the data. The predicted probabilities displayed in Table A-4 (Part I.C of this
Appendix) show that the effect sizes are very similar to those associated with
panels with two women in the outcome model. The switch from a man voting
on a panel with two other men to a man (woman) voting on a panel with two
women is associated with a growth in the probability of a procertification vote
by 29 (26) percentage points in the 1995–2017 model of published cases, 26
(23) in the 2002–2017 model of published and unpublished cases, and 22 (20)
in the same model but after excluding discrimination and other civil rights
claims.
In order to assess the relationship between gender panel composition and
dissenting behavior, we ran the models in Table A-2, Models A and B, but
substituting a variable indicating when a judge dissented as the dependent
variable (not displayed). All of the gender panel variables (including the one
designating a woman in the panel minority) were clearly insignificant. The
gender composition of the panel is not associated with the dissenting behav-
ior of men or women (not displayed).
PART II.C: RACE
Controlling for the partisan and gender composition of the panel, and the
variables listed in Part I.B of the Appendix, the race panel variables show
quite different patterns as compared to the gender panel variables, tracking
what we observed in the case outcome model. The variable capturing the
votes of white/other judges serving on a panel with one African American
(WHITE/OTHER VOTING WITH 1WO & 1AA) is statistically significant in all
three models, indicating that they are more likely to cast procertification votes
than when serving on an all-white/other panel. Likewise, the variable captur-
ing the votes of an African American sitting with two white/other judges (AF
AM VOTING WITH 2WOS) is significant, indicating that they are also more like-
ly to cast procertification votes than a white/other judge serving on an all-
white/other panel. These two variables capture the same panels (with one Af-
rican American and two white/other judges) and separately measure votes of
the African American and white/other panel members, showing that both are
statistically distinguishable from the votes of white/other judges on all-
white/other panels. The predicted probabilities displayed in Table A-4 (Part
I.D of this Appendix) show that the effect sizes are very similar to those asso-
ciated with panels with one African American in the outcome model. The
switch from a white/other judge voting on an all-white/other panel to a
white/other (African American) voting on a panel with one African American
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is associated with a growth in the probability of a procertification vote by 15
(16) percentage points in the 1995–2017 model of published cases, 13 (14) in
the 2002–2017 model of published and unpublished cases, and 14 (15) in the
same model but after excluding discrimination and other civil rights claims.
In contrast, when there are two African Americans on a panel, the varia-
bles measuring the votes of all judges are statistically indistinguishable from
the votes of white/other judges on all-white/other panels. However, there are
only eleven such cases in the data. We simply don’t have enough data to pro-
vide meaningful estimates of voting under this panel configuration. As was
true in the outcome models, there are no race panel effects if we pool all
nonwhite judges into a single racial minority category. The race panel effects
emerge only with respect to African Americans (not displayed). The presence
of one African American on the panel is not associated with the dissenting
behavior of white/other or African American judges, and we lack the data
evaluate this with respect to panels with two African Americans (not dis-
played).
PART III
In order to evaluate whether women from a particular political party have
a distinctive probability of procertification votes that is not captured by the
direct effects of party and gender, we examined interactions that isolate spe-
cific party-gender combinations. In the 2002–2017 model of votes in all cases,
with gender and race panel variables, we substituted a simple party dichoto-
mous variable for the party panel variables and interacted it with the panel
variables for a woman voting on a panel with one woman, and for a woman
voting on a panel with two women. The interactions isolate whether there are
distinctive effects on procertification voting associated with Democratic
women or Republican women. The interactions were insignificant, indicating
no positive or negative change in the probability of procertification votes as-
sociated with women from one political party not already captured by the di-
rect effects of party and gender (not displayed).
Likewise, we interacted the party variable with the variable capturing one
African American judge voting on panels with one African American. The
interaction isolates whether there are distinctive effects on procertification
voting associated with Democratic African American judges or Republican
African American judges. This interaction was also insignificant, indicating
that neither African American Democrats nor African American Republicans
had a positive or negative change in probability of procertification votes not
captured by the direct effects of party and race. In these models with interac-
tions, the variables for a man and a woman voting on panels with two women,
and for a white/other and an African American judge voting on panels with
one African American, remain significant, positive, and of comparable mag-
nitude as in Model B in Table A-3 (with party panel variables, and without the
interactions) (not displayed).
In order to evaluate whether African American judges of a particular
gender have a distinctive probability of procertification votes that is not cap-
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tured by the direct effects of race and gender, we examined interactions which
isolate specific race-gender combinations. In the 2002–2017 model of votes in
all cases reported in Model B in Table A-3, we added interactions of the vari-
able identifying African Americans voting on a panel with one African Amer-
ican, with the variables identifying a woman voting on panels with one
woman, and a woman voting on panels with two women. The interactions
isolate whether there are distinctive effects on procertification voting associ-
ated with African American men or African American women. The interac-
tions were insignificant, indicating no positive or negative change in the
probability of procertification votes associated with African Americans of a
particular gender not already captured by the direct effects of race and gen-
der. However, and importantly, there are so few African American women in
the data that we regard this as inconclusive (not displayed).
